

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MR. HASTINGS's

REVIEW

OF

THE STATE

OF

BENGAL.

LONDON:

Printed for G. KEARSLEY, at No 46, in Fleet-Street.

MDCCLXXXVI.

ADAMS220.10

PREFACE.

THE following ſheets were written at ſea, during my paſſage from India to England. When I began them, I had no other deſign than to preſerve and concentrate all the miſcellaneous tranſactions of the three laſt months of my adminiſtration, while they were yet recent in my remembrance.

In the courſe of this review, I was imperceptibly led to take in a larger ſcope, as I have ſtated in the the work itſelf; and it has required

ſuch

ſuch a degree of importance in the judgment of thoſe who have peruſed it, (authorities of which I ſhould ſpeak with the higheſt veneration on any occaſion, but one which like the preſent could not but reflect a praiſe on myſelf) that I have been induced to cauſe a few printed Copies to be ſtruck off, for the private information of ſuch perſons as from their official ſituations are intitled to the knowledge which they may be thought to contain.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Bath, Jan. 14, 1786.

ON the 20th of March, 1783, I addreſſed a letter to the Court of Directors, in which I apprized them of my intention to reſign the ſervice of the Company, leaving a ſufficient interval for the appointment of a ſucceſſor to my office. Had I formed my opinion of the propriety of this intimation on any eſtimate of my own conſequence, the total diſregard which was ſhewn to it might have taught me an humbler leſſon. But in truth, I had ſimply conſidered it as a point of common obligation; and was convinced in my own mind, that the Member of the Council who ſtood next to me in the regular line of ſucceſſion, was at leaſt as likely to fill the ſtation with ability as any perſon, wanting the ſame local experience, whom the chance of competition might ſubſtitute

in his ſtead; for he had been bred and practiſed in the habits of buſineſs, and his manners were conciliating. It would be therefore, at this time, ſuperfluous to aſſign any reaſons for the reſolution which I had taken. Yet theſe were detailed at large in my letter; and if they produced no other effect, they certainly were, as they were intended, a pledge to my firſt conſtituents for the performance of the declaration which I had thus formerly made, if no circumſtance intervened which might leſſen the weight of it as an engagement, or which, as a ſuperior claim, might require it to be ſuſpended. In effect, ſuch a contingency did actually come to paſs within a very few months after the date of my letter. This originated in an appeal which was made by the Nabob Vizir and his Miniſters, againſt the acts of Mr. *Briſtow*, the Company's Reſident at his Court, and impelled me, by every tie of juſtice, honour, and public duty, to ſacrifice every conſideration that regarded myſelf alone, if neceſſary, for his redreſs: And that my ſtay for this purpoſe was neceſſary, I may with ſafety at this time affirm, ſince it is demonſtrable, that the purpoſes

poſes which were the profeſſed objects of my ſtay have been attained, and could not have been attained without it.

I had fixed upon the beginning of laſt year for my departure to England. This event determined me to poſtpone it to another ſeaſon; and I may be allowed on ſuch an occaſion to appeal for the evidence, and the ſtrongeſt evidence that could be produced, of the rectitude of my motive, even to an argument of private relation to my own intereſt and feelings, but immediately connected with the reſolution I had taken; ſince it compelled me to ſubmit to a privation of all domeſtic ſociety, and to an expence which muſt be unavoidably repeated whenever I ſhould proſecute the deſign of my own departure to England, and which my fortune could ill afford. It was not incumbent upon me to apprize the Court of Directors formally of this change of my determination, or of the ground of it. Both were obvious. But the original obligation ſtill remained, ſubject to the reverſion of the ſame circumſtances under which it was impoſed. My

return from *Lucnow*, after a long and ſucceſsful application to the re-eſtabliſhment of the affairs of the province of *Oude*, and the due authority of its ruler, replaced me in the ſituation from which I had been drawn by the neceſſity of that attendance. It was, therefore, my firſt care to provide for the execution of the engagement dependant on it, after my arrival.

About the ſame inſtant of time, advices were received from England of a bill depending in Parliament for the more effectual regulation of the government of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India; and as I had deemed it a proper reſpect to the Court of Directors to refer myſelf to their pleaſure for my continuation in the ſervice, if they ſhould think me deſerving of being entruſted with the powers which I had ſtated as neceſſary to enable me to conduct it, I held it proper to wait the reſult of this intelligence, in the poſſibility of its producing that change in the adminiſtration of Bengal, which I had preſcribed as the condition of my ſtay. Of this I adviſed the Court of Directors, in a letter which I wrote to them, dated

the

the 22d of November, by the Surpriſe; repeating my former declaration, and informing them of my intention to wait the arrival of the next diſpatches, which I had been made to expect with the Fox packet, which was waiting at the date of the laſt advices to bring the orders which would be required with the publication of the bill depending. In the mean time, I applied myſelf early and aſſiduouſly to the diſpatch of ſuch arrears of buſineſs as I found depending; and to thoſe exigencies of the government which were likely to preſs, with the ſevereſt weight, upon it, in the event of a change not effected by expreſs authority from home, and therefore wanting the confidence and reſpect of a fixed appointment. The firſt object, and that recently urged by injunctions from the Court of Directors, which rather augmented our difficulties than facilitated the removal of them, was to clear off the debt which we had contracted during the courſe of a long and multiplied war. This conſiſted of two kinds:—Firſt, the regular debt at intereſt, which had continued for ſome time at the fixed ſum of one hundred and ſixty lacks; and Secondly,

orders

orders granted on the Treaſury and Depoſits, which at this time amounted to about Rupees 144,47,860 8 1. of theſe orders, ſome, which were in lieu of payment made by the Board of Trade, were charged with the cuſtomary intereſt.

When I left Calcutta at the beginning of the year, I had vainly flattered myſelf, with a confidence which impelled me to expreſs the ſame expectation to the Court of Directors, that we ſhould be able to pay off all the Treaſury orders, and diſcharge a part of the debt at intereſt, by the end of December. I was certainly warranted to form and give this aſſurance by a fair ſtate, which I tranſmitted at the ſame time to the Court of Directors, of our probable receipts and diſburſements to the preſcribed period. The cauſes of my diſappointment aroſe from the unexpected, and equally unneceſſary, detention of *Colonel Pearſe's* detachment at Maſſulipatam, when it was on its return to Bengal; by which an expence of near ſeventeen lacks of rupees was continued a twelvemonth beyond its computed duration; and from the enormous ſums of

a crore

a crore of rupees, diſtributed in remittances to the other Preſidencies, of which that of Fort St. George alone, which leaſt wanted it, and of whoſe diſburſements, whatever they were, our Board was kept in utter ignorance, had received for its ſeparate ſhare more than ſixty-five lacks. A detail of this ſubject would be too long an interruption of the general recital; and as it is fully compriſed in a letter which was written expreſsly upon it to the Court of Directors, dated the 6th of December laſt, I ſhall add it in the Appendix, referring to it for complete information.

I was not apprized of theſe unexpected charges till my return to Calcutta, having truſted to the eſtimate of receipts and diſburſements made at the beginning of the year above quoted, as a ſure proviſion againſt them. I was anxious to put an immediate check to the continuance of a drain which our finances could ill ſuſtain, and happily found the other members of the Board in the ſame diſpoſition and opinion. At our firſt meeting in Council on the 8th of November, I propoſed,

and

and it was agreed to with ſuch a promptneſs, that our orders were written and ſigned before we parted, to ſend a peremptory injunction to the Preſidency of Fort St. George, to deſiſt from further drafts upon us, declaring that we would anſwer none that were granted after the receipt of our letters.

To Bombay, whoſe wants were more preſſing, but had already received a very ample and acknowledged relief, we wrote to confine their demands within five lacks of rupees, until they ſhould receive our licence for a larger ſupply; and to this we afterwards added the promiſe of a further remittance, by bills from the Treaſury of Lucnow in the month of May next; for which a proviſion had been expreſsly made on a very profitable rate of exchange in the Kiſtbundy, or account of inſtalments, agreed upon by the Nabob Vizir in payment of his debt to the Company.

A few days before my return to Calcutta, but while I remained at a ſmall diſtance from it, a packet was received from the Court of Directors, which

which had been diſpatched by land, and contained a letter dated the 15th of June; in which they ſeverely cenſured the Governor General and Council, for having agreed, in the month of November 1784, to take up the ſum of fifty lacks, on loan for drafts on the Court of Directors, to ſupply a deficiency of nearly that amount in the advances made for the inveſtment of the year; when, as it appeared to them, our advances had already exceeded the value of the allotted proviſion by ——— lacks; and they therefore recommended to the Board to prevail upon the ſubſcribers to accept of a redemption of their loans in lieu of the promiſed bills.

As this diſpatch had been made for the ſole and expreſs purpoſe of conveying the ſentiments and orders of the Court of Directors on that ſingle ſubject, and therefore ſtrongly manifeſted the impreſſion which it had made on their minds, and impreſſed the conſequent neceſſity of compliance on ours, the part which we had to chooſe was both difficult and hazardous. The order was evidently founded on a miſtake; for

the Court of Directors, or rather, we muſt ſuppoſe, their official reporter, had confounded the advances of two years with thoſe of one. It was a becoming deference to conclude that, as the propriety of the order was inſeparably connected with the truth of the fact to which it was applied, they would not have paſſed the order under a contrary ſuppoſition; and that a diſcovery of the error would induce them to revoke it.

Our engagements had hitherto been held moſt ſacred, the Court of Directors having contented themſelves with expreſſing their diſapprobation of ſuch as they deemed not ſufficiently warranted; but never diſputing their validity, or withholding their effect, if it depended on them for giving it; and the former loans, which had been contracted on the ſame conditions, and for the ſame exigency, had received their expreſs approval in terms of applauſe. To receive their recommendation in the conſtruction of an abſolute order, and to execute it literally as ſuch, under the circumſtances which have been recited, would have been injurious to the ſervice, highly

culpable

culpable in its principle, productive of much aggravated diſtreſs in its immediate operation, and deſtructive of our future credit; fatally, perhaps, to the Company's exiſtence, if ever a ſeaſon ſhould recur of the like difficulties with thoſe which our credit had hitherto enabled us to ſurmount; at the ſame time to perſiſt in a literal adherence to our engagements, with the knowledge of ſuch an indiſpoſition in the Court of Directors towards them, would have been an injury to the ſubſcribers, if the Court ſhould refuſe to ratify them. Upon the whole, after much diſcuſſion, but little debate, a middle expedient was adopted; which was, to publiſh the whole ſtate of the caſe, and to give the ſubſcribers an option, either of the redemption of their loans, or of the acceptance of their bills, and to refer the latter to the juſtice and candour of the Court of Directors for their ratification of them. This ſubject engaged much of the attention of the Board in their two firſt meetings, held on the 8th and 9th of November, and paſſed with their unanimous aſſent. The inſtant effect was ſuch as could not fail to afford us the

moſt complete ſatisfaction; for the publication made no alteration in the minds of the ſubſcribers, who retained their original intereſt in the ſubſcription, only 2,51,500 rupees of it having been withdrawn, principally by perſons acting as truſtees for others, and therefore not chooſing to exerciſe the ſame latitude of judgment with thoſe whoſe property was at their own diſpoſal.

For a more accurate account of this tranſaction, I refer to the original papers in the Appendix, No. 1.

I found the Board engaged in an unpleaſant altercation with the Board of Trade, which had originated from prior orders of the Court of Directors, received by the Surprize Packet, which had left England on the 29th of April, and arrived in Calcutta on the 28th of Auguſt. Theſe contained ſome ſevere cenſures upon the Board of Trade for a latitude aſſumed in their allotment of contracts for the proviſion of the inveſtment, and a peremptory injunction to grant them, after due advertiſement, to the beſt bidder.

der. Our Council, in implicit ſubmiſſion to the letter of the order, exacted from the Board of Trade an immediate obedience to it; to which the Board of Trade objected, pleading, that in conſequence of an intimation given them by the ſuperior Council, early in the year, of their intention to appropriate one complete crore of rupees for the ſervice of the inveſtment of the ſeaſon, not accompanied or followed by any other inſtructions, they had iſſued immediate orders to their former agents and contractors, that no time might be loſt for ſo large a proviſion, to continue their advances on the terms of the laſt year; that theſe orders were intended and received as actual engagements, though not confirmed by any formal deeds, and had certainly the ſame effect after ſo long a lapſe of time; that the ſeaſon for making the advances, and other preparatory acts, was long ſince paſſed, and the ſeaſon for the returns approaching; and that any attempt to cancel the exiſting engagements, againſt which they thought the contractors would have their remedy at law, and to transfer them to new adventurers, with

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the neceſſary time allowed for public notice, and for poſſeſſion, would occaſion a total loſs of the inveſtment for the ſeaſon.

To theſe objections, which really poſſeſſed all the weight given to them by the Board of Trade, it might have been added, that the order of the Court of Directors, though, as I recollect, rather indefinitely worded, muſt have been intended for a rule of general practice, and could not poſſibly be meant for immediate application; ſince it would not have been received till the latter end of October, or the beginning of November, if the Surprize had made her paſſage in the ordinary time, which ſhe had ſhortened by two months; and of courſe, the Board of Trade would have been in the receipt of part of the goods provided, and the reſt would have been in the courſe of delivery. At all events, the order was now become ineffectual. It was therefore propoſed, and happily agreed to, to cloſe the conteſt, by yielding the point of it to the Board of Trade, and allowing their engagements to ſtand, with the reſponſibility thrown on them for its effect with relation

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to the order received from home. At the ſame time, as the Court of Directors in their Report delivered to the Houſe of Commons on the 23d of March 1784, and which they had called upon us with much ſolemnity to verify, had ſtated the whole ſum of the expected cargoes from India for that year at one million ſterling, of which the proportion that Bengal alone bore to the other Preſidencies was but thirty lacks; the Board of Trade was required to limit the proviſion to that ſum for the preſcribed articles of their inveſtment, with the addition of fifteen lacks for raw ſilk, which was not in the liſt; both to allow for the proviſion actually made, and to preſerve the manufacture, which had been much improved both in price and quality. The Board of Trade contended for a larger allowance; but a peremptory declaration of the Superior Board prevented a repetition of the demand.

I have ſaid, that it was the firſt object of the Board (it was at leaſt my own) to clear off our debts, by leſſening our diſburſements; as the only means of fulfilling the commands and expecta-

tions

tions of the Court of Directors, and of affording an effectual relief to the other Presidencies; since a lavish dissipation of our treasures beyond our current income, however specious the occasion might appear, or however urgent the call might be, as it was in the instance of the orders of the Court of Directors, grounded on their Report presented to the House of Commons, would only add to our difficulties, not unlike a thread drawn to its utmost length from an entangled skein.— Our natural exigencies must be supplied; the army must be paid a portion of its arrears for its subsistence, and the larger was their amount the less would it admit of encrease; the whole amount, therefore, of the annual pay, of whatever denomination, must after a certain run be distributed to them: The restoration of peace, and the return of our foreign detachments, required that as large a portion of the army should be disbanded as had been superadded to our fixed establishment in the course of the war; but the corps which were to be disbanded, were to be first paid up to the period of their service; nor could they be paid, and the others neglected,

without

without exciting general diſcontent, at all times dangerous in tranſactions of military œconomy; but above all, when the neceſſity of retrenchments, and the known intention of making reformations, had diſpoſed the minds of men to a quicker reception of ſuch impreſſions as led to mutiny: Expedients, if they were to be found, muſt be uſed, either to anſwer or to ſhift the actual demand; and every ſuch expedient will be found to be the preſent gain of one rupee for the future loſs of two: The debt, as it increaſed, would throw the proſpect of payment to a greater diſtance, and proportionably increaſe the diſcount of the original ſums, which was already very large, both on the Intereſt Notes and Treaſury Orders: The multitude of bills unpaid created the like accumulation of accounts unaudited, and the conſequent licentiouſneſs of contingent charges, beſides the natural incitement to irregular claims when the expected receipts were either partial or remote. Though the Treaſury was oſtenſibly charged with the eſtabliſhed rate of intereſt, its ſubſtantial loſs was equal in moſt caſes to the diſcount, ſince every

contractor, and other dealer on truſt, either with the Board, or Board of Trade, took the difference into the account, either by enhancing the rates of originating engagements, or eluding the conditions of the old. Yet the debt itſelf was inconſiderable: And here it may not be amiſs to take notice of the fallacy of the general cry which has prevailed for ſome time paſt, of the loſs of our public credit; than which nothing can be more foreign from the truth.

The fact is, that our public credit, by which I mean the credit of our Intereſt Notes, and Treaſury Orders, never extended beyond the Engliſh ſervants of the Company, and the European inhabitants of Calcutta; and to theſe may be added a few, and a very few, of the old Hindoo families at the Preſidency. All the other inhabitants of the Provinces are utterly ignorant of the advantage and ſecurity of our funds, and have other ways of employing their money, ſuch as purchaſes of landed property, loans at an uſurious and accumulating monthly intereſt, and mortgages; to which, though leſs profitable

profitable in the end, and generally inſecure, they are ſo much attached by long uſage, and the illuſion of a large growing profit, that it would not be eaſy to wean them from theſe habits for others more difficult of comprehenſion, and to them of inſuperable diſcredit, from the idea of inſecurity attached to the dependence on power. And happy for the Company, is it, that ſuch bounds are preſcribed by neceſſity to their public credit; and that it is not in the power of a weak adminiſtration to load its ſucceſſors with debts improvidently contracted for the relief of its own exigencies.

The want of credit, as it is falſely called, in Bengal, is not, as the term implies, a want of confidence, but of means, in thoſe who were the creditors of our Treaſury. When theſe had no more ready money to lend, the Government appeared to be greatly diſtreſſed, becauſe its expences continued at the ſame amount with the reſource ſtopped, by which they had been ſupplied beyond the extent of its current income; and as the proſpect of diſcharging the debt which

it had contracted became ſo much the more remote, and in a degree doubtful, from the hazards of a ſtate of multiplied warfare, its notes firſt loſt their equal currency by a natural conſequence, and afterwards ſunk yet more in their value. The ſame cauſes afterwards affected the orders on the Treaſury, although in the courſe of payment, but at uncertain periods. Yet, when I left Bengal, our debts of every denomination amounted to no more than 304,00,000 current rupees, which is little more than one half of our annual revenue, which may be fairly eſtimated at 5 ½ crores of current rupees, or 5 ½ millions ſterling.

With this clear, and certainly true ſtate of the queſtion, how will it appear to any candid judgment, that after a war ſuſtained during the courſe of five years with three ſtates of the greateſt relative power to our own ſituation and connections, the Marattahs, Hyder Ally Cawn, and the French; after having ſent two great armies to the extremities of Indoſtan and Deccan; after having furniſhed ſubſiſtence to the other Preſidencies,

ſupplied

ſupplied the China trade with yearly remittances, and made richer inveſtments for England than were ever purchaſed in the ſame ſpace of time under any preceding adminiſtration; our reſources are exhauſted, and our credit gone, becauſe we owe a ſum which we cannot inſtantly diſcharge, but *which ſcarcely exceeds half our annual revenue!* I repeat the poſition in the ſame terms, becauſe it cannot be too often repeated, nor its impreſſion too forcibly made in ſuch a diſcuſſion. Let the ſame caſe be put of a private eſtate ſo encumbered, and its proprietor reduced by it to a ſtate of bankruptcy. It is an abſurdity in terms: But if the compariſon be carried higher, to the enormous magnitude of the ſum in which the parent ſtate is indebted, a ſum which all the treaſures of this habitable world could not realize, the attempt to fix the imputation of inſolvency on the treaſury of Bengal would be too contemptible for argument.

When I took charge of the government of Bengal, in April 1772, I found it loaded with a debt at the intereſt of nearly the ſame amount as

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the preſent; and in leſs than two years I ſaw that debt compleatly diſcharged, and a ſum in ready caſh of the ſame amount actually accumulated in ſtore in the public treaſuries; and in effect the preſent debt ought to be cleared off, as I have no doubt it will be, compleatly, in two years of peace, if the preſent peace is of that duration. Some time before my departure the Accomptant General delivered in to the Board an eſtimate of the probable reſources and diſburſements of the Bengal government, from the 30th of April, 1784, to the 1ſt of May, 1785; from which it appeared, that at the end of that period the claims on our Treaſury would exceed our reſources by 1,49,01,433 current rupees; or, in other words, that independently of our bonds we ſhould be indebted this ſum, either for loans, or for arrears of pay, or other current diſburſements. On the ſuppoſition that this ſtatement were juſt, this would be a heavy debt or deficiency. But even this, which I deem exaggerated, will be found, on a comparative examination, to be conſiderably leſs than what actually exiſted at the time when the acccount was formed. For the proof of

this

this assertion, I refer to the account itself, No. in the Appendix; from thence it appears, that on the 30th of April, 1784, we were indebted as follows:—

Balance due to sundry departments		2,87,146	12 11
Disbursements in arrears, viz.			
Civil	16,55,934 6 0		
Military	51,38,887 13 5		
Marine	3,39,486 15 1		
Revenue department	17,77,126 6 7		
		89,11,435	3 7
Extraordinary disbursements in arrears, viz.			
For deposits due from the Treasury	10,47,600 13 2		
Due on sundry orders thereon	2,87,142 11 5		
Due on ditto in favour of the Board of Trade	45,45,897 5 7		
Due on ditto for surplus to, and drafts of the other Presidencies.	24,39,750 3 0		
Due from the Lucnow Treasury to the Bankers and Mr. Scott	18,21,707 8 8		
Due on various accounts	63,886 13 10		
		102,05,985	7 8
Current Rupees		1,94,04,567	8 2

The

The amount therefore of our debt and arrears, independent of bonds, on the 30th of April, 1784, was 1,94,04,567 8 2 current rupees; but from this we ſhould in juſtice deduct the amount of the ſums remaining at the ſame period in charge of the different offices, being 40,63,877 2 6 current rupees; and the real deficiency of our finances at that time will be found 1,53,40,690 5 8 current rupees, being more than the deficiency calculated for the 1ſt of May, 1785, by 4,39,256 9 9 current rupees.

Many of the articles which compoſed our debt in April, 1784, would run on without much inconveniency to the creditors till May, 1785; and there are ſome even which could not with propriety be diſcharged. Of the former kind are the orders on the Treaſury, of which as ſome were paid off, others might be granted to an equal amount.

Such alſo are the arrears of ſome of the Offices. Of the latter kind are the depoſits in the Treaſury, which are never reſtored until demanded,

and

and which have continued for a long ſeries of years at nearly the ſame amount.

But in fact, this eſtimate, though formed with all poſſible accuracy at the time, has from changes of circumſtances, in the intervening period, already proved in many particulars erroneous; the receipts being under-rated, and the diſburſements ſtated beyond their real amount. I will mention a few inſtances. The ſales of the ſalt are rated in this account for the whole year at only thirty lacks of rupees; whereas, it appears from an actual account delivered to me by the Comptroller, that on the 31ſt of December, 1784, he had paid into the Treaſury 44,20,000 Sicca rupees; and he expected to make further payments by the 30th of April, 1785, to the amount of nine lacks, making altogether 53,20,000 Sicca rupees, 61,71,200 current rupees; and the event has hitherto always more than verified the amount of his eſtimates.

The receipts from the opium are in the ſame manner eſtimated under their probable amount, having already been exceeded by the proceeds

ariſing from only a part of the opium, which was ſold a few days before I left Calcutta. The whole ſales, when compleated, would yield about ſeventeen lacks, being five lacks more than Mr. *Larkins* has ſtated in his account.

I do not ſee any eſtimate in this account of the receipts ariſing from the ſales of the Company's Europe imports; theſe may be computed on a medium at nine lacks.

The grounds on which I ſuppoſe that Mr. *Larkins* has ſtated the diſburſements at a higher rate than they will actually amount to, are theſe: The eſtimate is calculated at the rate of our eſtabliſhments in April, 1784; but in the month of January, 1785, a general reduction took place in all our eſtabliſhments, both civil and military, which would have a conſiderable effect in diminiſhing the diſburſements of the three remaining months of the year. As this reduction extended generally to the eſtabliſhments dependent on the various offices which were aboliſhed, without particularizing each article, the exact amount of the whole ſaving cannot be aſcertained, until the particular

ticular accounts formed in conſequence of it are received from Bengal. Setting aſide the effects of this reduction, if the circumſtances which I have before mentioned are taken into the eſtimate, the ſtate of our deficiency may be corrected as follows:—

Deficiency per Mr. *Larkins'* eſtimate on the 30th of April, 1785, viz.		1,49,01,433 11 11
Deduct receipts beyond what Mr. *Larkins* has eſtimated viz.		
Further receipts from the ſalt	23,00,000	
Ditto the opium	5,00,000	
Receipts from the import ſales	9,00,000	
Sicca rupees	37,00,000	
Batta 16 per Cent.	5,92,060	
		42,92,000
Total deficiency eſtimated for the 1ſt of May, 1785		1,06,09,433 11 11

which is leſs than what I have ſhewn was our deficiency on the 30th of April, 1784, by 47,31,256 9 9 current rupees.

I now proceed. As almoſt every act of the Board which was not in the ordinary courſe of buſineſs, during the ſhort interval comprehended

in this review, was formed on the principle which I have already mentioned, or with a view to it, I ſhall recite them as they accord with the general ſubject, leaving ſuch as are of a different kind to follow, without regard to the order of time in in which they paſſed.

In the conſultation of the 22d of November, two other reſolutions paſſed, which afforded the proſpect of conſiderable relief in our means of expence: One, to with-hold the ſupply to Canton, which was the leſs neceſſary, as the Supercargoes, who beſt knew their own wants, had not required it; and we knew that they could generally command any ſum that they might have occaſion for, by drafts on the Court of Directors. The other was immediately connected with it. The uſual mode of remittance to Canton was by opium, either ſent on account of the Company, or by ſale to individuals, the amount of the ſales being payable to the Company's caſh in China.

By the firſt we were conſtantly loſers, and I believe ſuch will be the invariable conſequence of attempts

attempts of the ſuperior adminiſtration, charged as it is with ſo great a variety of affairs, to entangle itſelf in the nice and intricate minutiæ of commerce; and in the latter the opium had always ſold below its real value, or to ſpeak more properly, below the value which the firſt ſale ought to bear in the proportion of its demand, and eaſy ſale abroad.

It was agreed to advertiſe the ſale of it in lots at public auction, and to receive Treaſury orders in payment. By this advantage fairly taken of the eagerneſs of individuals to convert their Treaſury orders into caſh, or uſeful merchandize, we cleared off more than ſixteen lacks of our current debt, and raiſed the ſale of the opium to a profit exceeding by much the diſcount of our Treaſury orders.

At this time we had more ſhips on hand, reckoning thoſe which were expected, than we could provide with cargoes. Our ſupplies to Bombay, though very ample, were yet inſufficient for all their wants. Their inveſtments

of

of coffee we underſtood to be an eſſential article; in ſo much, that in the laſt year they had ſent one of the Company's ſhips to Mocha for a cargo of coffee in the expectation of obtaining it on credit, but failed; and the ſhip returning empty, they purchaſed at an advance of fifty per cent on the prime coſt, and drew upon Bengal for the amount, a quantity ſufficient for her lading, from a private adventurer. This may ſerve for one illuſtration of the improvidence of deſultory expedients. It occurred to us that one of the ſhips which was then laying in the river might be profitably employed in this ſervice, and the Camden was accordingly choſen for it. The Board of Trade was directed to provide for the purpoſe a ſmall inveſtment of cloth and rice, the produce of which was to be inveſted in coffee, with an allowance to the Commander to draw upon the Company for the deficiency. I am aware that it will perhaps be objected to ſome of theſe meaſures, that in relieving our own exigencies we have only increaſed the burthen of the Company, by leaving it to fall on them with accu-

mulated

mulated weight from other parts of their general adminiſtration; that, for inſtance, in ſtopping the ſupplies to China we have intailed on the Company the expence of paying the bills which the ſupercargoes muſt draw for money taken up at Canton; or, that in prohibiting further drafts from Madraſs, we have obliged that Preſidency to reduce their inveſtment, or to borrow money at a large intereſt; or, in more propriety of ſpeech, to iſſue bonds in lieu of payment for their current expences. Such objections, though they are in reality inapplicable, yet being mixed with facts, to thoſe who conſider the ſubject ſuperficially, will appear juſt, and more eſpecially where the mind is already prepoſſeſſed with thoſe ideas which have been ſo univerſally adopted, and which, in truth, have been one great cauſe of our preſent embarraſſments.

It ſeems to have been ſuppoſed that the reſources of Bengal were inexhauſtible; and to the meaſures which ſprung from ſuch ideas muſt we aſcribe a great part of the diſtreſs which its government has experienced.

Whatever

Whatever charges might be incurred at the other Preſidencies, whether occaſioned by ſpeculative plans of encreaſing their inveſtment, or by a laviſh waſte of their treaſure, it was the leſs regarded how far their own reſources fell ſhort of their diſburſements, ſince Bengal was looked on as an inexhauſtible fund, from whence the deficiency might eaſily and readily be ſupplied. Hence it is, that the drains from Bengal for the ſupport of the other Preſidencies have been annually increaſing, till at length they have amounted in 1784, as I have already obſerved, to the enormous ſum of a crore of rupees.

It is true that the reſources of Bengal are great; but they are not inexhauſtible. After defraying all the charges of its government, and all expences of its civil and military eſtabliſhments, Bengal is perhaps capable of yielding an annual tribute of one crore of rupees to the Company; nor is it material to the country whether the remittance be made entire in cargoes exported to England, or divided by aids ſent

to

to the other Preſidencies and China; but it can only be made through the medium of trade.—Every rupee drawn from its currency, whether in ſpecie or in bills, which will amount to the ſame effect in the end, will gradually exhauſt it of its vital ſtrength; nor will the effect be felt until it be too late to adminiſter a remedy for it.

The ſources of opulence which it poſſeſſes in the fertility of its ſoil, and the number and induſtry of its inhabitants, will, I think, admit of its yielding the tribute I have mentioned; which is perhaps greater than any other country in the world could bear, poſſeſſed only of the ſame ſources, and like it, without any mines of gold or ſilver. But if more is to be improvidently exacted, theſe ſources may fail, and Bengal be rendered incapable of yielding what it might have done with eaſe. The ordinary ſupplies to the other Preſidencies, which were once moderate, were ſufficient for their wants; ſuch may not now be adequate to the effectual relief of their exigencies; yet it is certainly better, that the means of furniſhing them in future ſhould be

preſerved, than that by attempting too much, they ſhould be cut off for ever. Bengal wants only a little reſpite to retrieve its own affairs, it will then with eaſe furniſh the uſual ſupplies to the other Preſidencies, and perhaps be able to increaſe them, ſo as to aſſiſt in clearing off their incumbrances. But if the ſtrain be carried too far on Bengal in its preſent ſtate, I predict, that not only its capacity of aſſiſting the others muſt annually diminiſh, but its own embarraſsments increaſe ſo as to endanger its very exiſtence, if ever it ſhould be preſſed by any calamity. The recovery of Bengal is the object therefore of the firſt conſequence to the Company, and is in effect the firſt mode of ſubſtantial relief to the other Preſidencies.

Of the two foreign detachments, one had been ſome time returned from Surat, under the conduct of Colonel Charles Morgan, and diſſolved. The other, commanded by Colonel Pearce, in the Carnatic, had been unfortunately detained at Maſſulipatam, as I have before obſerved, during the laſt ſeaſon preceding the rains, and did not

repaſs

repaſs the boundary of Bengal till the end of the laſt year. I ſtaid long enough for the melancholy pleaſure of ſeeing the remains of this valuable corps after its return, and to join the regretful, but neceſſary order for its diſſolution. Theſe reductions, by the abolition of an expenſive ſtaff, and a heavy contingent expence, will prove a conſiderable relief to our general military charge. But a more extenſive and radical cure was yet wanted for the great diſeaſe of our finances, and this I had the inexpreſſible ſatisfaction to ſee compleated, and adminiſtered before my departure. One plan was formed for a general retrenchment of all the civil; another of all the military eſtabliſhments. Theſe appeared before the Board in their firſt and rough ſtate on the 20th of December, and were paſſed on the 4th of January. They will be beſt underſtood by a reference to the minutes at large, which will be No. in the Appendix. I ſhall make ſome obſervations upon the general ſubject.

Among the many invectives, whether excited by policy, malevolence, or truth, which have

been thrown upon the adminiſtration of Bengal, that of a laviſh expenditure of the public money, in current expences, and in fixed eſtabliſhments, has been a conſtant and laboured ſubject of declamation. Alluſions are made to it as to a fact of ſuch notoriety, as to preclude the neceſſity of evidence; at leaſt, no inſtances have been adduced in proof of it, which have come to my knowledge. No credit has been given to the Government of Bengal for having added more than a crore of rupees,* in the midſt of all its difficulties, to the public revenue; no remembrance retained of the applauſe beſtowed on the ſame adminiſtration for former retrenchments made, and a ſyſtem of œconomy formed, when the temper of the times admitted it; no conſideration allowed for the ſums inveſted in the ſupport of the Company's commerce, which it has alone ſupported; nor for the defence of the Company's other Preſidencies, which, but for that defence, would have been loſt; no merit aſcribed to it for having maintained the ſplendor of

* One million one hundred thouſand pounds ſterling.

of the national character in all its military operations, unalloyed by a ſingle failure of ſucceſs, or imputed error; nor for having inſured the bleſſings of peace, ſecurity, and abundance, to the ſubjects of its immediate dominion, while it dealt out the terrors of conqueſt to the remoteſt enemies of the parent ſtate, and of its own aſſociate members; and while every other member of the Britiſh Empire was afflicted with the plagues of war or inſurrection. As little was it noticed with how inconſiderable a charge upon its fixed reſources theſe ſervices were performed, and how diſproportionate, beyond all degrees of compariſon, with the growth of the national debt, or with the product of that debt in the national ſervices, within the ſame period. It was ſufficient, that our expences had greatly exceeded thoſe of our peace eſtabliſhment, to infer from it, without further enquiry, that the exceſs was ſolely the effect of diſſipation.

Yet let me be allowed to repeat the ſuppoſition which I have already taken occaſion to make: Were Lord *Clive* to awake from the dead, or Mr.

Vanſittart,

Vanſittart, great as was the mind of the former, and extenſive as the knowledge, and ready the reſources of the latter, and to be told what powerful exertions had been made by Bengal, within the laſt ſix and ſeven years, and what was its actual ſtate and capacity, neither the one nor the other would give credit to the information, but pronounce it to be impoſſible, from the recollection of what they knew of the powers of that government, and from any allowance which they could make for its ſubſequent improvements.

Yet I do not affirm that the charge was abſolutely groundleſs. There never yet was a ſyſtem of public œconomy to which it would not in a degree apply. Some of its offices were overpaid, nor were the emoluments allotted to all exactly proportioned to their importance, truſt, or the ability required for diſcharging them. It is impoſſible that they ſhould, where offices exiſt at the time in which their ſalaries are determined, and many are to determine them. Men were not invariably appointed to offices to which they were ſuited, or beſt ſuited by their talents, experience,

rience, or integrity. It is impoſſible that they ſhould, where the power of patronage is in many hands, and exerciſed under the influence of perſonal favour, or of ſuperior patronage.

Contingent bills, which form the moſt uncontroulable ſource of the general diſburſements, were neither audited as they came in, (and every delay is in this caſe a cauſe of increaſe in expence) nor when audited, corrected with that ſeverity with which contingent accounts ought to be corrected; and the foregoing cauſes may be alledged for this effect alſo.

To enumerate every caſe would be endleſs. In a word, while the power of government is in the hands of many; and the ſmaller the number is, the greater is the evil in this caſe; while each hand holds an equal ſhare of it; while the members of government retain their places by ſufferance, and the terrors of diſmiſſion and diſgrace are held out againſt them at home; when their accuſers and the expectants of their places are the judges of their conduct, and preparers of the evidence on which it is to be tried;

tried; when the members of the government themſelves are in diſagreement with each other, and that diſagreement (with regret and ſhame I ſuppoſe it) is excited by the voice of authority; when each member ſtands in need of ſupport from home, and owes returns for the ſupport which he receives; when each claims an indulgence from the others, and has it in his power to retaliate every diſappointment, which may be eaſily underſtood, but can never be imputed; and laſtly, when the moſt meritorious conduct is denied its credit, and even the ſacrifices of intereſt are branded with the reproach of venality; from a government ſo conſtituted, what reformation can be expected?

Yet what could be done, has been done; and I know not whether I feel moſt ſatisfaction or regret in the reflection, that my adminiſtration cloſed with an act, which though moſt neceſſary to the public expectation, will give cauſe of mortal offence to numbers, both in India and England, and ſubject me to the charge of ingratitude from every friend at home, who regards the return of perſonal

perſonal favour as an obligation ſuperior to the conſideration of public exigency; and I expect to experience this, and worſe effects of it. Yet there never was a time in which I ſtood in more need of perſonal ſupport, or had a ſtronger private inducement to court it. But as I ſaw a neceſſity for attempting a new and compleat reformation, I could not reconcile it with duty or honour, to leave ſo invidious a work to my colleagues, when I could render it leſs odious to them at leaſt, by taking a ſhare, and a principal one, in the formation of it; when I thought (as every man in my ſtation ought to think) that I could perform it with more effect than others could; and eſpecially when I conſidered, that it was an act that would or ought, at leaſt, to extend in its operation to the diſtance of years beyond my own time, and was therefore the moſt important ſubject of my attention, as the moſt laudable of my ambition. As to the execution, that is the moſt eaſy part of it; for when the plans are formed and iſſued in orders, what remains is merely negative: And it will require little trouble to refrain from creating new offices, or additions

of ſalary; nor ſtretch of capacity to refuſe unneceſſary advances of caſh, or the ſanction of prohibited charges.

Before I left Calcutta on my viſit to Lucnow, in February, 1784, I with ſome difficulty prevailed on the Board to conſtitute a Committee for auditing accounts. I was induced to recommend this meaſure by the long experience of the inſufficiency of the Superior Board for that kind of detail, eſpecially where the members of it did not mutually poſſeſs an implicit confidence, and moſt cordial agreement. Beſides, the examination of accounts requires an ocular inſpection, and that kind of abſtracted attention which cannot be beſtowed on a ſecretary reading them, nor by many ears attending. In effect, though the Board aſſembled regularly on every Thurſday in their department of inſpection, for the profeſſed purpoſe of examining accounts, I can ſecurely affirm, that the whole aggregate of buſineſs tranſacted by the Board in this department collectively, in the courſe of a twelvemonth, was not

equal

equal to that which a ſingle member, uninterrupted, could have diſcharged in one morning.

In the plan which I gave in for the formation of the new office, and which was paſſed with little alteration, I adopted the conſtruction of the Board of Accounts which exiſted at Fort St. George at the time in which I was a member of the Council there; and which was admirably calculated for quick diſpatch, as well as to preclude, as much as poſſible, all unfairneſs from prejudice or favour. The plan itſelf will be added, No. in the Appendix.

I was the more deſirous of effecting this point at the time, from the apprehenſion of being long abſent from the Preſidency; and I flattered myſelf that by this expedient the moſt important and eſſential part of the current buſineſs would be diſpatched with regularity. The event did not anſwer my expectations, the conſtruction of the Committee differing eſſentially from the principle of its conſtitution. The civil audits were indeed brought up to the lateſt period,

which was a very material point attained; but the military, the moſt important, were in long arrears, and the accounts of all the foreign detachments, which the Board had with great labour examined, and either paſſed the minuter corrections, or laid down the general rules for thoſe which were of the ſame kind, but of more frequent occurrence, with orders for their reference for complete adjuſtment to the Commiſſary General, remained after the lapſe of a year unnoticed, having neither been tranſmitted to the Commiſſary General, nor even tranſcribed from the rough minutes. Theſe, and all the other depending accounts, underwent the ſeparate inſpection of the members of the Board, a work of great labour; thoſe of the military detachments referred with proper inſtructions to the Commiſſary General, and all the reſt brought up to the end of the month of December, by the 27th of the month enſuing.

I have enlarged on this ſubject beyond the claim which it may appear to have from its obvious conſequence; both becauſe it is connected

nected with the general principle of frugal œconomy, and with the principle of that duty with which I ſhall cloſe this recapitulation; I mean the obligation of leaving as few incumbrances as poſſible on the hands of my colleagues, and eſpecially of my ſucceſſor; and for that purpoſe of beſtowing an unuſual portion of my own perſon and labour upon them before my departure.

In my accomodation with the Nabob *Aſſoph ul Dowlah*, I had agreed to withdraw the detachment commanded by Colonel Sir *John Cumings*, from Furruckabad, and had continued the eſtimate of its expence in the ſum which the Nabob was charged with for the current year no longer than to the end of December, allowing the intermediate time for the return of the detachment within our own borders; and I left orders for that effect in the hands of my military Secretary Major *Palmer*, whom I left as my agent at Lucnow, to be iſſued whenever the force deſtined to ſupply its place from the Nabob's own eſtabliſhment ſhould be

be ready to occupy the ſtation. This detachment ſtood at a yearly charge of near twenty-three lacks of rupees, of which nine lacks conſiſted in ſtaff allowances, and excluſive diſburſements appertaining to it as a ſeparate corps. The laſt ſum would have been immediately ſaved by the reduction; and a ſaving of the whole, or nearly the whole, might have followed by the diſcharge of as many Sepoy regiments as the number compoſing the detachment, no longer wanted with the termination of the ſervice in which it was then employed. I had once before attempted the ſame meaſure in the year 1782, and had even recalled the detachment then ſtationed at Furrackabad; but I was under a neceſſity, cauſed by many conſiderations of a policy to which I ſhould have yielded little reſpect under a better conſtituted ſyſtem of Government, to revoke it. The Nabob had never ſolicited the aid of a military force, for the defence of that frontier, and he alone was, or ought to be, the judge of his own wants. In truth, it was not wanted; but it greatly injured his authority, it affected his revenue, and added

a large

a large ſum to the annual exceſs of his debt to the Company, without any real ſaving to our own diſburſements, ſince it was a ſuperfluous increaſe of our military ſtrength, if not required for that ſpecific ſervice. Beſides, it was too remote for diſcipline and controul; and many foul evils, unknown to the ſervice before the formation of the corps which were entertained by our Government for the Nabob's ſervice and pay in the year 1785, had originated from this deleterious ſource.

The opportunities which my reſidence at Lucnow, and a nearer and more intimate intercourſe with the King's Miniſters afforded me, of eſtimating the ſtrength of the different States whoſe poſſeſſions bordered on the Nabob's Northern dominions, or who might approach them in their occaſional incurſions, impreſſed me with the ſtrongeſt conviction of the inutility of the appropriation of any part of our military ſtrength to ſuch a defence, for which a much ſmaller force of the Nabob's own Sepoys, rabble as they were, were more than adequate againſt a worſe rabble

of

of any that could be oppoſed to them. But the other Members of the Board judged otherwiſe, and reſolved on continuing the detachment; and, however I might feel the inſtant mortification of ſeeing my own judgment, formed on actual knowledge and intimate obſervation, ſuperceded by private ſuggeſtions; for no knowledge could the other Members have had, but from individuals; I was but too ſenſible of the diſadvantage under which I ſhould conteſt this point, if I did conteſt it in my approaching ſeparation from the ſervice, which inveſted my ſucceſſor with a plea, ſpecious at leaſt, for an excluſive option in the proviſion of meaſures which were required by his ſenſe of the public danger in which I had no longer any concern. And when I found both him and the other Member of the Council inflexible againſt the arguments which I urged in ſupport of my own propoſition, I ſubmitted; making the repeal of my former orders an act of my own authority, that it might not appear the effect of oppoſition, and produce a dangerous influence on the credit of the ſucceeding adminiſtration. No. in the

Appendix

Appendix, contains the minutes which paſſed in the diſcuſſion of this ſubject.

As the deſign of my long reſidence at Lucnow was materially connected with the general object of the preceding recital, I ſhall inſert my report of that tranſaction in the Appendix, No. More need not be recapitulated of it in this place than its termination, which was a corrected adjuſtment of the Nabob Vizir's debt, now ſettled, with the growing ſubſidy, and other current payments due for the year of the computation called Fuſſelee, which ends with the Engliſh month September, 1785, at 1,05,00,000 rupees of the Lucnow ſtandard, and made payable according to the following monthly inſtallments:

To be paid to the end of Bhadoon.		
In ready money ———	9,00,000	
In bills ———	10,00,000	
	———	19,00,000
To be paid to the end of Coar — —		5,00,000
Ditto — — Katag — —		5,00,000
Ditto — — Augun — —		5,00,000
Ditto — — Poos, viz.		
In ready money ———	5,00,000	
Bills on Surat or Calcutta —	15,00,000	
	———	20,00,000
To be paid to the end of Maay — —		3,25,000
Ditto — — Phagoon — —		3,25,000
Ditto — — Cheyt — —		3,25,000
To be paid to the end of Byſaak — —		3,25,000
Ditto — — Seyt, viz.		
In ready money ———	3,25,000	
Bills on Surat or Calcutta —	10,00,000	
	———	13,25,000
To be paid to the end of Aſſar — —		3,25,000
Ditto — — Sawan — —		3,25,000
Ditto — — Bhadoon, viz.		
In ready money ———	3,25,000	
Bills on Surat or Calcutta —	15,00,000	
	———	18,25,000
Lucnow Rupees of 23, 24, 25, and 26 Suns		1,05,00,000

I had the ſatisfaction of learning a few days before my departure, that the kiſt, or demand for Poos, which was the laſt due, and which was the

the heavieſt kiſt of the year, had been completely diſcharged; and I have every well grounded reaſon to believe, that the remaining payments will be as punctually made; ſo that the Nabob's debt, which, when I went to Lucnow, amounted to 72,95,656 4 7 current rupees*, and was the accumulated growth of many years, was now reduced to about 23,00,000 rupees.

The other tranſactions of the Board, which paſſed in the period of this review, having ariſen out of accidental emergency, unconnected with any fixed and followed rule of conduct, I ſhall be brief in my recital of them.

On the 16th of November, letters were written to the Marquis de *Buſſy*, to the Director and Council for the Dutch ſettlement at Columbo, to the Government General of Batavia, and to the Preſident and Select Committee of Fort St. George; propoſing and warranting the means for

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* Vide account drawn out by the Accomptant General, and laid before the Board, with his letter of the 24th of February, 1784.

accommodating the long depending diſpute between the latter and M. de *Buſſy*, reſpecting the mode of transferring the ceſſion of Trincomale, according to the late treaties with France and Holland, to the repreſentatives of the latter; the Marquis de *Buſſy* claiming to deliver it immediately to the Dutch Government at Columbo, according to the intent and ſpirit of the treaties, and Lord *Macartney* and his Committee to be put in poſſeſſion of it on the part of Great-Britain, that it might be delivered on their part, and by their agents, to the Dutch, according to the letter of the treaties. After a variety of elaborate and ſubtle diſcuſſion of this unſubſtantial difference, by which, if all parties were not loſers, none apparently gained, it had been agreed, between the two Governments of Fort St. George and Pondicherry, to refer the point in diſpute to their reſpective Courts in Europe; and a French frigate had been diſpatched from Pondicherry for that purpoſe, in which Mr. *Staunton*, private Secretary to Lord *Macartney*, had been permitted to take his paſſage for the explanation of what had paſſed on the ſide of the Government

of

of Madraſs, in relation to this conteſt. We decided (deeming ourſelves, as the ſuperior and controlling power on the part of the Britiſh nation in India, competent to decide) that the Marquis de *Buſſy* ſhould cauſe the ceſſion to be immediately made by his own agents, whom in that caſe we authoriſed to act as ours to thoſe of the Dutch Government of Columbo; and we required him in return, to reſtore the town of Cuddaloor to the Government of Fort St. George, which had been with-held by this unprofitable delay; the treaties having expreſsly ſtipulated, that the reſtitution of all places taken in the courſe of the war, which were to be reſtored, ſhould take effect at the ſame period of time. Period!——an unhappy word, the grammatical conſtruction of which, occupied a large portion of the correſpondence which paſſed between the Select Committee of Fort St. George and the Marquis de *Buſſy*, and yet remains unreſolved.

If ſuperſtition may be admitted to ſuggeſt the ſources of thoſe untoward ſeries of political events, which the common ſenſe of mankind

cannot

cannot reconcile to any intelligible cauſes, that which I have been relating ſeems to be under the government of a peculiar kind of fatality; for to a plain underſtanding, there appears to be no reaſon which could have hindered the effect of the treaties on their firſt promulgation, but many to promote it; yet, after the profeſſed endeavours of all parties, and the expiration of many months, it was more diſtant than ever; and when a peremptory meaſure was adopted, which ſeemed to enſure its eaſy ſucceſs, the death of the Marquis de *Buſſy*, of which we were appriſed a few days preceding my departure, will moſt probably have defeated the end of that alſo. In the mean time, the Dutch loſe the benefit of their confeſſed right of poſſeſſion; the French have the charge of it without any dependant advantage; and keep the poſſeſſion of our fort and territory of Cuddaloor, probably with as little advantage, though to our certain loſs and injury.

My report of the negociations which I performed at the injunction of the Board, for obtaining the return of the Prince *Mirza Jehander Shaw*

Shaw to his father's Court, contains all that is neceſſary for information on that detached ſubject. As an object of mere curioſity, I ſhall, however, prefix to it a narrative written by the Prince himſelf, of his flight, which will perhaps afford more entertainment to moſt readers of theſe numerous ſheets than the contents of all the reſt.

Some time preceding the Select Committee of Fort St. George had by different ſhips ſent round many of the King's officers and ſoldiers to Calcutta. Their motive for this act was probably to free themſelves from the expence of their ſubſiſtence, for we had no official information of the purpoſe of it, nor indeed were we at all appriſed by what authority many of theſe conſignments were made. This laid the Board under ſome difficulties. The ſenior officer, Colonel *Gordon*, had received orders from the Proviſional Commander in Chief upon the coaſt, concerning the diſpoſition of theſe men, and for recruiting the corps to which they belonged; and he, in virtue of this commiſſion, aſſumed the exerciſe of an authority which the Board (having no regular

regular knowledge of him) could not admit. The perſonal merits and ingenuous manners of Colonel *Gordon*, exacted from the Board a degree of reſpect, in the obſervance of which, ſomething too much was yielded of a power of which he was either entitled to the complete exerciſe, or of which he ſhould have been denied the right altogether.

It is needleſs to enumerate all the little ſubjects of altercation which aroſe out of this equivocal ſtate. It is ſufficient to ſay, that the Board finally decided, as the proper and only judges in ſuch a conteſt, by ordering all the men, whoſe time of ſervice was expired, and were willing and fit to enter into the Company's ſervice, to be entertained, and the remainder to be embarked for England. To the officers, who were more than a hundred in number, and who would have been ſubjected to great inconvenience, nor the Commanders to leſs, by being crowded as paſſengers in the Company's chartered ſhips, were allowed, to thoſe who choſe it, fixed ſums as paſſage-money, to provide their own

own means of conveyance. An ill-judged claim, aſſerted by Colonel *Gordon*, to ſuperſede the authority of the Board in appointing general court-martial, afforded an occaſion for addreſſing the Court of Directors upon the general ſubject of the contradictory and ill-defined powers of the Board and the King's military Commanders in Chief in India, as they at this time ſtood in relation to each other, and to treat it with a large and free diſcuſſion.

All theſe various points are contained in the ſeveral minutes of Council, which will be recorded in the Appendix under No.

I now come to the chief object of this recapitulation; namely, my ſeparation from the ſervice. Although I conſidered this as an event already determined, having myſelf long ſince fixed the neceſſity and obligation of it by declarations, which left no option to my diſcretion, and little chance of their being rendered null, by the reſervations which a due reſpect for authority had impelled me to annex to them; yet, as the

poſſibility, at leaſt, of theſe reſervations being verified by the event, was implied in my having made them, and as I knew that the Parliament of Great-Britain was, at the time of the laſt advices from thence, employed in the conſideration of ſuch points as neceſſarily led to thoſe, which in one determination of them, might prove the pledged grounds of my continuance in office, I reſolved to wait the arrival of the next diſpatches, which I was given to expect, by thoſe of the Surprize, would ſoon follow in the Fox packet, or in the Cygnet ſloop of war. But ſo near was my ſenſe of this ſuſpenſion to certainty, that I was exceedingly anxious to give early notice to the Court of Directors of my determination in this ſtate of it; nor was it leſs neceſſary to repeat the advice of the loſs which the conſtitutional adminiſtration had already received by the death of Mr. *Wheeler*, of which no information had yet been ſent, except an expreſs diſpatched by myſelf in November from Benares, and intended for a conveyance by land from Bombay. The Surprize having approved herſelf the fitteſt veſſel that we could procure for a voyage of expedition,

pedition, the Board agreed to hire her for this occaſion for a freight, eſtimated by the inverted proportion of the time in which ſhe performed her paſſage. She was taken up on the 19th of November, and left her pilot on the 16th of December. No. is my letter addreſſed by her to the Court of Directors.

In this letter, I expreſſed my intention of waiting the arrival of the next regular diſpatches from England; but on the 20th of the ſame month, I received a packet by the way of Buſſorah, which put an inſtant period to all my heſitation. It brought me letters dated in London as late as the 3d of Auguſt, and information of a bill for the regulation of all the various branches of the Britiſh poſſeſſions in India, on an entirely new and permanent ſyſtem, which had actually paſſed the Houſe of Commons, and had been received with ſo little oppoſition in the Houſe of Lords, as to denounce its paſſage, with no eſſential change, through that channel of the legiſlature alſo. The parts of it which bore a relation to my office, and to thoſe points which I had fixed

as ultimately deciſive of my reſolution, were the clauſes which declared the conſtitution of the government of Bengal to reſide in a Governor General and a limited number of counſellors, with the ſame equality of powers as that of the exiſting conſtitution; and which, though it confirmed the preſent members in their places, left their removal at the diſcretion of the King's Miniſter.

The firſt of theſe clauſes was a determinate removal of the ſuppoſition, in the eventual verification of which, I had declared that I would ſtill continue to retain the ſervice and my office, and by a conſonant and neceſſary inference impoſed on me the indiſpenſable obligation of reſigning both; for I had repeatedly, in addreſſes to the higheſt authority to which I was permitted to addreſs myſelf, declared that I would do it. As to the latter, it had no other effect upon my mind, in reſpect to my determination already confirmed, that to diveſt it of all concern for the conſequence; ſince the grounds aſſigned for the conſtruction of the new bill, as I gathered them from

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printed extracts, and from the concurrent information of private letters written to others as well as to myself, were such as indicated my dismission as the necessary conclusion from them; nor could I descend to so humble a sense of my own unimportance, as to suppose that the declarations which I had made and repeated of my intention would pass totally unnoticed, when they related to an effect of such magnitude, as the transfer of the first efficient authority by which the new system was to be conducted into hands not expressly selected for it. I therefore concluded, that either my destined successor was already on the way, or such orders as were to prescribe the intended succession, in whatever mode it was to take place in virtue of the new act. It is true that no public or official notice had been received of the act, nor were we informed yet by any authority that it had actually passed; but my private conviction of both was complete; nor was this a consideration determinable by the grounds of prescribed authority. My resignation of the service was left by the power which had conferred it to my own free option; and I had therefore no

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other rule for determining it than my own private ſenſe of public obligation, and conſiſtency of character. I knew that the Company's diſpatches which even in caſes of the moſt preſſing emergency had of late years been ſubjected to great delays, had received other cauſes of obſtruction from the multiplication of the channels through which they were now to paſs; and it appeared as abſurd to me, as it would have borne to others the appearance of preſumption, to wait for confirmation of what I already ſufficiently knew for my own uſe, and loſe by waiting, as I moſt probably ſhould, the ſeaſon for my departure. But why ſhould I expatiate on a point of ſo little moment to any but myſelf? If I am conſcious of having maintained, to the laſt act of my public life, the integrity of conduct and the conſiſtency of thoſe principles which I had laid down for the regulation of it, neither my conſtituents, whoſe intereſts even in this inſtance were my leading object, nor my friends, who have with-held from me their belief in my profeſſions, nor my enemies, if I yet have ſuch, who have laboured to effect by violence that act which I have performed

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upon myſelf, have any right to paſs their cenſures upon me; I am accountable to myſelf alone; and in the approbation of my own mind, I feel a ſupport which the world cannot move. Yet may I feel a regret, to ſee that hope which I had too fondly indulged, and which I had ſuſtained during thirteen laboured years with a perſeverance againſt a ſucceſſion of difficulties which might have overcome the conſtancy of an abler mind, of being in ſome period of time, however remote, allowed to poſſeſs and exerciſe the full powers of my ſtation, of which I had hitherto held little more than the name and reſponſibility; and to ſee with it the belief which I had as fondly indulged, that I ſhould become the inſtrument of raiſing the Britiſh name, and the ſubſtantial worth of its poſſeſſions in India, to a degree of proſperity proportioned to ſuch a truſt, both vaniſh in an inſtant, like the illuſions of a dream; with the poor and only conſolation left me of the conſcious knowledge of what I could have effected, had my deſtiny ordained that I ſhould attain the ſituation to which I aſpired, and

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that I have left no allowable means untried, by which I might have attained it.——But enough of this.

I have already ſaid, that I had protracted the time of my departure, as I had originally fixed it, on account of the appeal made to me by the Nabob Vizir. The ſame cauſe might yet detain me. It was therefore the firſt proviſion which I had to ſecure in forming my reſolution; and before I formed it, I accordingly delivered to the Board a minute, in which I mentioned the probability of my early departure, and required, as one previous ground of my determination, the poſitive declaration of their intentions with reſpect to my late arrangements with the Nabob Vizir, to whom I had pledged my word that I ſhould, before my reſignation of the ſervice, exact ſuch an explanation from the members of the Board, and that I would not reſign it unleſs I received from them an abſolute and unqualified promiſe on record, and confirmed by letter from my eventual ſucceſſor to him, that no reſident

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ſhould be ſent, nor any deviation made from my engagements, whilſt he and his Miniſters performed theirs in the punctual diſcharge of the monthly payments of the year. My minute was communicated to the other members of the Board on the 4th of January, and anſwered on the 14th, by a joint and liberal aſſurance on their part, expreſſive both of their reſolution to abide by my engagement, and of their ſenſe of it as an obligation independent of the actual occaſion. Of one part only they made an exception, which was the continuance of the detachment at Futteygur, which ſubject had already been diſcuſſed at large, and concluded. Indeed it made no eſſential part of my engagement with the Nabob Vizir; and the Nabob himſelf had ſeaſonably furniſhed me with a recent plea for ſuſpending the execution of this meaſure, by the alarm which he had taken at the events which had followed the death of *Affraſiab Cawn*, the King's Miniſter, of which I may have occaſion to ſpeak hereafter, and by his apprehenſion of troubles on that frontier; an apprehenſion which I thought,

and ſtill think, to have had no juſt warrant, but which, as he entertained it, afforded an idea of better ſecurity to him from the continuance of the detachment, and to the public eye, the appearance of its being dictated by a regard to his intereſt. Yet as the expence of this corps had no proviſion made for it in the Kiſtbundee after the end of December; and the Nabob's reſources, of which a large portion had been derived from credit and the contributions of his neareſt relations, were barely equal to the ſum already pledged; to have demanded this ſubſidy in addition, and made it payable in the current year, would have been equivalent to a diſſolution of his agreement, by annexing to it a demand which it was not poſſible for him to anſwer. I therefore on the ſame day ſtated the further neceſſity of receiving the clear determination of the Board on this ſubject, and received it in the moſt ſatisfactory and unequivocal terms.

Knowing how rapid the report of a change ſo intereſting to many would prove in its progreſs

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and extenſion as ſoon as I had notified it, though my firſt notification of it was private and confidential, and with-held from the conſultations, I had early prepared the Nabob and his Miniſters for it, and repeated the aſſurance which I had before made them, of providing for the ſecurity and duration of my engagements with them.

As ſoon as the Board had paſſed their laſt reſolutions above-mentioned, letters were immediately written and diſpatched to them by Mr. *Macpherſon* and myſelf, to appriſe them of the ſubſtance of them. Theſe minutes and letters, with others which compriſe the connected progreſs of this tranſaction, will be ſeen in the Appendix No.

I had now another point to attend to, which was to guard againſt the effects to which the impending change in the adminiſtration might be liable, without ſome precautions taken to prevent it. The length of time in which I had held the firſt office of the Government, although with no efficient powers derived from its conſtitution, had

inveſted me with many peculiar or perſonal advantages. My character was known; or (which was equivalent in its conſequences) the general opinion of it was fixed: The invariable train of ſucceſs with which all the meaſures, which were known to be of my own formation, were attended; the apparent magnitude and temerity attributed to ſome of theſe, which proved moſt fortunate in their termination; and the wonderful ſupport and gradual elevation which my perſonal character had derived, during a long and progreſſive ſeries of contingencies, ſuch as have rarely fallen to the lot of an unconnected and unpatronized individual, from the coincidence of events appertaining to remote and foreign cauſes, or to the courſe of nature, with the criſis of my own fortune; and above all, from the virtuous and indignant ſpirit of my immediate employers, and the voice of my country, fortuitouſly combining my fate with other objects of infinitely higher conſideration; had altogether contributed to excite a degree of ſuperſtitious belief, in the minds of almoſt all men who were ſituated within the ſphere of my authority or influence, that the

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ſame ſucceſs would crown all my future endeavours; nor let it be a matter of wonder that ſuch a prepoſſeſſion ſhould gain credit with men to whoſe religious principles it is familiar: I myſelf avow the ſame belief ſo long as my actions ſhall be directed by the ſole impulſe of duty, unbiaſſed and unmixed with regards of perſonal intereſt, and even of perſonal reputation. My correſpondence with the chiefs and rulers of Hindoſtan and Deckan, had been improved to a ſtyle and ſtate of more intimate connection than is uſual in ſuch diſtant communications, by frequent opportunities of reciprocal kindneſs and co-operation of intereſts. All the defects of our Government, and the conſequent diviſions and inſtability of our counſels, were known to all the ſtates around us. From all the preceding cauſes it was to be apprehended, that my departure from office, and the ſucceſſion of another whoſe character was yet unfixed, and whoſe political opinions had hitherto appeared very different from mine, would be attended with many conſequences of diſtruſt and uncertain expectation.

To prevent this, I wrote early letters to all our political friends, appriſing them of the probability of the impending change even before it was finally determined, and preparing them to receive Mr. *Macpherſon*, as a connection bequeathed to them with the ſame ties of ſentiment and attachment, and united with me in the ſame plan of ſupporting the faith of alliance abroad, while I availed myſelf to what influence I might be allowed to poſſeſs at home, to render them more ſtable and permanent, by endeavouring to obtain for them the ſanction of higher authorities for their ſecurity and laſting duration.

Theſe ſentiments and deſigns were declared more formally and explicitly in my laſt letters, and confirmed by declarations conſonant to them from Mr. *Macpherſon*, whoſe conduct towards the Nabob of Owde, which was no leſs ſeaſonable in its operation than liberal in its principle, would ſerve as a yet ſtronger aſſurance of the continuation of the ſame ſpirit influencing our government to all who had the opportunities of viewing our tranſactions with

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that ſtate, and who were acquainted with the differences which had formerly ſubſiſted between us reſpecting it. Nor was it in letters only that I ſtrove to inculcate and proclaim this expectation. I enforced it by verbal aſſurances to the foreign agents and miniſters reſident in Calcutta, ſome of whom had for many years been my conſtant attendants, and by ſuitable inſtructions to our own.

In a word, I conſidered it as a duty indiſpenſible with the act which I was about to perform, to guard it by all poſſible means againſt all poſſible ill conſequences; not by the oſtenſible forms and cold language of official notification, but by the uſe of every honeſt practice that could be ſuggeſted by a zeal determined on accompliſhing its purpoſe. What remains for the part of my ſucceſſor is eaſy, and I have no doubt of the effect being ſuch as to expoſe me to abundant ridicule, if ever theſe ſheets ſhall become public, for attributing to myſelf ſo much importance as to apprehend any conſequence whatever from my being

being in or out of an office, in which I poſſeſſed ſo little of real influence. If the reverſe ſhould happen, I may be as much cenſured for not having foreſeen it as unavoidable.

I ſhall ſubjoin in the Appendix a tranſlation of two of the letters written on the preceding occaſion from Mr. *Macpherſon* and myſelf, with a liſt of the reſt, and their general ſubſtance.

I ſhall now endeavour to deſcribe in as minute a manner as poſſible, the ſtate of affairs as they ſtood at the time of my departure in every department of the Government, and cloſe it with ſuch neceſſary obſervations as ſhall occur to me reſpecting it.

The political ſtate of Bengal claims the firſt place in this deſcription, not ſo much from its real and intrinſic conſequence. I make this diſtinction, becauſe I know that every ſentiment of my own on this ſubject will be repugnant to the opinions of many, and liable

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to the cavils of every man who looks only for an occaſion of cavil.

This head may be divided into two parts; the firſt, its relation to foreign European States; the ſecond, its relation to thoſe of India.

Firſt; The States of Europe, which I rank in the following order, as beſt agreeing with their reſpective conſequence in India: The French, the Dutch, the Danes, and Portugueſe. When I left Bengal, the French had not reclaimed the poſſeſſion of their factories; and the old inhabitants of Chandenagore ſtill drew their ſubſiſtence from the bounty of the Company. I apprehended no difficulty from their return, as they are entitled to no greater privileges by the treaty of peace than thoſe which they poſſeſſed before the war. But if the agents, who are commiſſioned to receive their poſſeſſions, are of captious characters, or are inſtructed to make unreaſonable demands, they may give trouble; which, however, may be eaſily avoided by a refuſal on our part to argue with them, referring

every point of diſpute to the letter of the treaty, for which a proviſion is made in it; and leaving them to appeal to Europe for any other pretenſions.

The Dutch were replaced in their ſettlements, the form of diſplaying their colours being ſingly denied them, until they were entitled to complete poſſeſſion by the execution of thoſe ſtipulations of the treaties with France and Holland, which preſcribe, that the reſtitution of all conqueſts, made by each nation on either of the others, ſhould take place at the ſame period of time; the French ſtill retaining Cuddaloor.

The Dutch received this conceſſion without thanks, and complained in coarſe and indignant terms of the national diſtinction being with-held from them.

The Daniſh ſettlement of Fredericknagore was become a great reſort of trade, and the Chief, Mr. *Bie*, whoſe behaviour, as well as that of his predeceſſors, had been invariably humble

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and unaſſuming, had lately adopted a tone of independence, and laid claim to immunities in virtue of a pretended firmaun, of which he refuſed to produce a copy.

The excluſion of the French and Dutch during the paſt years of war, and the ſecurity with which their ſhips navigated the India ſeas, while ours were ſubjected to great riſques and high rates of inſurance, had thrown almoſt the whole trade of Bengal into their hands. To this effect two other cauſes contributed; one, the exemption claimed by the Danes, and in part obtained, though diſputed, from the rigour of our offices of cuſtom; and the other, the aſſiſtance afforded them (as I have always underſtood and believe) by Britiſh ſubjects, under the Company's protection, in providing their inveſtments. The former of theſe cauſes is likely to operate with a more extenſive miſchief, when the French and Dutch are completely reſtored to their factories, and reſume the privileges of their trade. Nor can I deviſe any better expedient for obviating it, although I have given it much and frequent

conſideration, than a total abolition of all duties whatever; for in what way ſoever they may be modified, the foreign ſettlements will diſpute our right to ſearch their ſhips, or levy the duties on their trade by detail; and they will of courſe pay much leſs than the merchants of our own dependance.

It is true, that the Britiſh Government, having the power, might with eaſe repreſs every oppoſition to its rights, and to the rules which it has preſcribed to the navigation of the river Ganges, which is its proper dominion: But if a brutal Commander ſhall refuſe to admit the viſits of our officers, and ill treat them, I am not ſure that it will be always prudent for the Members of Government to puniſh the outrage, although it would certainly be their duty to do it; ſince it would, without fail, become a ſubject of paſſionate and exaggerated appeal from the ſuffering party to its conſtituent State; and if it ſhould not ſuit the ſituation of our own at the time to hazard an open rupture with it, an eaſy ſacrifice might be made of the devoted offenders, and

that

that conduct, which, in a better ſupported member of the Britiſh dominion, would be applauded and rewared, would in this inſtance be reprobated, with the aid and influence of that faſhionable prejudice which aſcribes every act of the Government of Bengal to improper motives, and brands the authors with criminality.

One example may be quoted to contradict this reflection, which, therefore, I ſhall ſtate to juſtify it.

A little before the beginning of the late war a French ſhip did refuſe to admit an officer from the Fort of Budge Budgea, though his orders were no more than to require the name of the ſhip, and the nation it belonged to. The Governor General and Council, after much temperate conſideration of the caſe, deemed the inſult offered to their authority, connected with the peculiar time of its commiſſion, a proper ground for checking it as a firſt attempt to infringe their privileges. An order was iſſued to prevent the ſhip from paſſing the batteries of

Fort

Fort William, for it had been ſuffered by the delay to paſs thoſe of Budge Budgea, until it had complied with the law of the port; and the Commander perſiſting, ſome blood was unhappily ſpilt, in conſequence of which he ſubmitted. Vehement remonſtrances and proteſts were iſſued againſt us by Mr. *Chevalier*, who was never ſlack upon ſuch occaſions: And there is no doubt that his repreſentation of the affairs was not leſs violent to the Court of France: But the war in the mean time breaking out, ſunk this with other ſimilar grievances in oblivion. It muſt be acknowledged, that our behaviour in this inſtance paſſed with impunity; but on the other hand it received no approbation from home; and I humbly conceive, that ſuch an act ought, in the firſt inſtance, to have been either expreſsly condemned, and the repetition of it prohibited under ſevere penalties, if wrong; or if right, not barely approved, but liberally commended.

Beſides the difference ariſing from the reſiſtance which I have deſcribed, there is another occaſioned

occaſioned by the adherence to an ancient right which the Company poſſeſſes, to collect a duty on all goods imported into the town of Calcutta, or exported from it. During the long indeciſion of the queſtion of territorial right, an obvious policy will keep up the exerciſe of every acknowledged right which the Company poſſeſſed before they had acquired more than their ancient commercial territory, and the Cuſtom-Houſe of Calcutta is one of them. Were this queſtion determined, and the commercial and territorial property adjudged to the ſame primary charge, it would certainly be adviſeable to aboliſh this duty, ſince it ſubſiſts to the great injury of the trade of the Preſidency, which is ſubjected to a double payment and the vexations of two offices, while the dependants of the foreign ſettlements pay but to one, and that but partially.

A total abolition of all the cuſtoms, with a due reſervation of the Company's ancient right, and of courſe the removal of all the Chokies, or places eſtabliſhed for levying them, which no regulations or vigilance of Government have been

been able to reſtrain from being an intolerable oppreſſion on the native traders, would abundantly diffuſe the trade of the provinces, and by the natural effect of multiplied competition increaſe both their wealth and reſources of revenue. This meaſure is liable to one ſtrong objection: Its effects, though demonſtrable, would be ſecret and conſtructive; but the ſacrifice made to obtain them would be immediate and viſible, in the loſs of eight or ten lacks, which are now annually brought to account from the collections of the cuſtoms, and in the enhanced prices of the Company's inveſtment.

The Board has taken ſome ſteps in the inveſtigation of this ſubject, but without any ſatisfactory reſult; nor is it likely that they will have proceeded in it in the preſent ſtate of their authority.

The other cauſe to which I have attributed the growth of the Daniſh trade, namely, the colluſion of Britiſh influence, will ſubſiſt with other evils of much greater magnitude, in defiance of all

all the orders from home, while thoſe conſiſt in ſimple prohibitions and denunciations of ſevere penalties, without co-operative means taken to enforce them, and a generous allowance for the intereſts, feelings, and natural claims of individuals; without which, all laws will be but the inſtruments of tyranny, or prove abortive.

For proof of what I have ſaid concerning the actual ſtate of the Daniſh trade in Bengal, and it may be offered as a collateral proof of the protection beſtowed on it by our government, I ſhall ſubjoin in the Appendix, No. a liſt of their ſhips which have been imported at Fredericknagore during the laſt nine months, amounting to no leſs than twenty-two veſſels of all dimenſions, but moſtly three maſts, and many of thoſe from Europe, and their burthen altogether to 10,830 tons.

The Portugueſe import annually three or more veſſels from China, beſides others which come directly from Europe. They claim no privileges, receive the protection of the port, and ſeem to merit encouragement.

I have not mentioned the Americans among the foreign importers; but as their ſhips have already found their way to China, other adventurers may come to Bengal. No orders have been written from England concerning their reception in ſuch caſe; and I do therefore conclude that they will meet with encouragement on the general principle, that every acceſſion of national commerce muſt prove an acceſſion of national wealth. Objections may be ſuggeſted to the application of this maxim to the caſe ſuppoſed, but none that will not originate from the equivocal ſtate of the Company's property, which is in a thouſand inſtances hurtful to the general intereſt; and in this particular caſe, it may be a ſufficient anſwer to the objection, to ſay, that if the Americans are denied the direct privilege of the trade of Bengal, they may obtain it indirectly, and to our great loſs, through other channels.

Secondly; Of the political ſtate of Bengal, with relation to the States of India; and, firſt, of the

MARATTAHS. The peace concluded with the Peſhwa through the intervention, and with the

the guarantee of *Madajee Sindia*, had received ever coincident acceſſion of general intereſt and particular policy which could enſure its long duration; for the general ſtate had recovery by the treaty, all the places which had been taken from it by the war; it had no object in view which it could claim from us, or with which our power ſtood in competition; and it had more of evil to dread from the ambition and rapacity of its neighbours, who would not fail to take the advantage of their being again engaged in a war with us, than they could hope of good from any ſucceſs againſt us. A trivial diſpute had ariſen between the Government of Bombay and the Adminiſtration of Poonah, concerning a petty Chief of the Marattah dependency, who had drawn upon himſelf the reſentment of his ſuperiors by repeated and avowed acts of hoſtility, and the Preſidency of Bombay, in conſequence of a treaty of defenſive alliance ſubſiſting between them, had interpoſed with ſome angry letters to ſave him. The matter having been referred to us by that Preſidency, in this ſtate of it, we clearly decided, that their engagement with him

could in no caſe operate againſt that recently made with the State of which he was a vaſſal, much leſs in that of acts in which he was confeſſedly the aggreſſor; and we peremptorily directed them to withdraw their interference.

The minority of the Peſhwa, and the degree of independency, confirmed by long preſcription, which the principal Jagheerdars, or feudal members of the Marattah State, have acquired, and maintained by various adventitious advantages, ſtill liable to be overthrown by the ſuperior pretenſions of the ſovereign authority, whenever it ſhall be in a capacity to aſſert them, have created an oppoſition of inferior policy amongſt them, which is more likely to concern our intereſts in the event of a war, were any other cauſe to produce a war, than to produce one.

The power of *Nanna Furneeſs*, the Dewan or Miniſter of the Peſhwa, is derived ſolely from his office, and the feeble and variable ſupport of ſome of the other Chiefs; that of *Moodajee*, the acting repreſentative of the *Booſlah* family, from his

his high rank and right of territory acquired by the ſanction of written treaties; and that of *Mahdajee Sindia* from his military ſtrength and perſonal ability. The reſt deſerve no notice.

Nanna Furneeſs ſhewed an early diſpoſition to connect himſelf with the French, and ſtill maintains a friendly intercourſe with them. To this policy he ſeems to have been impelled more by his dread of the aſcendency of *Mahdajee Sindia*, as it affected his own influence, than by any conſideration of the general ſtate; and *Mahdajee Sindia* appears to have formed as early a view to an alliance with our nation, which ſoon manifeſted itſelf in effects incapable of being attributed to any other cauſe, and has produced its ſubſtantial accompliſhment in two treaties, one concluded ſeparately with himſelf, and the other with the Peſhwa, inveſting him, under the character of guarantee, with a power conſtructively ſuperior even to that of his own Sovereign in all caſes which relate to our nation.

The *Booſlah* family, poſſeſſing a conſtitutional claim to the ſovereignty, a more aſcertained

right

right of ſeparate dominion, and but a ſcanty revenue, ſtands in continual awe of the ſuperior ſtate, and of every member of it around them, occaſionally uniting their intereſts with each, but principally with *Nizam Ally Cawn*, whoſe territory lies intermixed with theirs, and who is no leſs an object of their apprehenſions. Their connection with the government of Bengal, which originated in advances made by *Shabajee Booſlah* in the year 1773, was continued with his ſucceſſor *Moodajee*, and has ſubſiſted undiſturbed to this time. The intereſt which they felt in it was manifeſted by many ſubſtantial and uncommon inſtances of kindneſs, and though the man who planned this policy is no longer living, there is no doubt that this, as well as every other general meaſure of his formation, is ſtill followed by the preſent Adminiſtration. The perſon to whom I allude is *Dewagur Pundit*, who was ſucceſſively Dewan, or Miniſter, of *Janoojee*, *Shabajee*, and *Moodajee*, and the ruler of all their counſels.

What was his object in ſoliciting our alliance with ſo much ardour as he evidently ſhewed to attain

attain it, cannot with certainty be affirmed, though many obvious motives may be aſſigned for it; and as obvious are the cauſes, though too long to enumerate, and unneceſſary, to the preſent diſcuſſion, which have hitherto reſtrained him and the adminiſtration which ſucceeded, from endeavouring to draw any direct advantages from it: There is no preſent cauſe to apprehend any alteration in this diſpoſition of the family, and it will be always the intereſt of our Government to cultivate it.

It may be proper to mention as a circumſtance perhaps not univerſally known, that the dominion of the *Booſlah* family, commonly known by the general name of *Berar*, ſpreads over a great extent of country adjoining, or intermixed with thoſe of the Peſhwa, Nizam, Ally Cawn, Mahdajee Sindia, and Bengal; and that Nagpore, its capital, is the central point of all Hindoſtan and Deccan.

Having mentioned the different intereſts which ſeem to divide the preſent members of the

Marattah

Marattah State, I ſhould leave the ſubject imperfect, were I not to add, that the Marattahs poſſeſs alone, of all the people of Indoſtan and Deccan, a principle of national attachment, which is ſtrongly impreſſed on the minds of all individuals of the nation, and would probably unite their Chiefs, as in one common cauſe, if any great danger were to threaten the general ſtate.

Tippoo Saheb is the next power in conſequence. The peace concluded with him has every appearance of duration, though ill kept on his part, many of our ſoldiers and Sepoys being ſtill detained in his hands, and many officers miſſing of whom no account had been obtained: And for them his plea may be, that they fell the victims of his barbarity before we obtained a right by treaty to their deliverance. Some other ſymptoms of hoſtility were ſaid to have appeared near the frontier of the Carnatic, but may have ariſen from the mutual ſuſpicions of the contiguous garriſons, and at any rate could not have been of much importance, ſince, as I recollect, two or

three

three companies of Sepoys had been ſent to repel them. It is not likely that Tippoo ſhould ſo ſoon chooſe to involve himſelf in a new war with us deprived of all his confederates, and theſe become his rivals; nor that whenever he ſhall have formed ſuch a deſign, he will ſuffer it to break out in petty broils with our borderers.

Strong indications of approaching hoſtilities had appeared both between *Tippoo Saheb* and the Marattahs, and between him and *Nizam Ally Cawn*; the Marattahs, wiſhing to regain their former territory wreſted from them by *Hyder*, and *Tippoo* making encroachments on the poſſeſſions of *Nizam Ally Cawn*.

Nizam Ally Cawn, the Subadar of Deccan, is more reſpectable from his rank and deſcent than from any other cauſe. His dominions are of ſmall extent and ſcanty revenue; his military ſtrength is repreſented to be moſt contemptible; nor was he at any period of his life diſtinguiſhed for perſonal courage, or the ſpirit of enterprize. On the contrary, it ſeems to have been his con-

ſtant and ruling maxim to foment the incentives of war among his neighbours, to profit by their weakneſs and embarraſſments, but to avoid being a party himſelf in any of their conteſts, and to ſubmit even to humiliating ſacrifices rather than ſubject himſelf to the chances of war. Yet, if we may judge by events, he may be ſuppoſed to poſſeſs, with an abundance of the pride of illuſtrious blood, a ſound and diſcerning judgment. Our nation has no cauſe to hold him in contempt; for it is indebted to his policy both for the firſt deſign and execution of the confederacy formed by himſelf, the Marattahs, and Hyder, which in its conſequences had nearly cauſed our deprivation of the Carnatic, and has left it an incumbrance upon us which no time can retrieve.

Nizam Ally Cawn both avowed himſelf the inſtrument of this fatal meaſure, and juſtified it on the principle of ſelf-defence againſt the acts and declarations of the Preſidency of Fort St. George. The early redreſs afforded him againſt both, by the Governor General and Council, either withdrew him from the confederacy, or yielded

yielded him a ſpecious pretext for declining the part which he had engaged to take in it; and from that period we may date his connection with the ſuperior government of Bengal, with which he has ever ſince maintained a friendly intercourſe, and allowed the reſidence of a Miniſter of theirs at his Court: Allowed, for his fears, not cauſeleſsly excited, oppoſed the reception of a ſucceſſor to Mr. *Holland*, our firſt Miniſter, on any other ground than that of an occaſional commiſſion durable at his pleaſure.

Mr. *Richard Johnſton*, the preſent Reſident, has recently communicated to the Board the plan of a new and laſting alliance which had been the reſult of many conferences with the Nabob and his Miniſters, and conſiſted, in abridgment, of the following propoſitions.

Firſt, The reſtitution of all the Sircars of Northern diſtricts, obtained from him by the treaty of 1768, for an equivalent in price; explained to be the Sircar of Guntoor, in exchange for all the arrears of the Peſhcuſh; and the others for one crore and half of rupees.

Secondly, An alliance offenſive and defenſive.

Thirdly, A ſtipulated number of regiments, of native troops, to be ſtationed with him for a ſubſidy of 25,000 rupees per month for each regiment; the Nabob in like manner to ſupply the Company on demand with 5000 cavalry; I forget at what rate of pay; nor is it material, as the condition is not likely to be ever exacted.

Fourthly, The Peſhwa to be included as his ally.

Fifthly, That we ſhould acknowledge him the only lawful Subadar of Deccan.

Sixthly, That all other Europeans ſhould be excluded from Deccan and Balagaut.

Seventhly, Confirmation of all former treaties in ſuch articles as were not revoked or altered by this.

Eighthly,

Eighthly, That the treaty ſhould be ratified by the King of Great-Britain.

To underſtand the quality of the firſt article, which is the moſt eſſential, it is proper to mention the following circumſtances:——

1*ſt*. That the Sircar of Guntoor, eſtimated to yield a rent of 2,07,500 pagodas, or 7,26,250 rupees, became our right of property by the death of *Biſſalut Jung*, the brother of *Nizam Ally Cawn*, in whoſe poſſeſſion it had been allowed to remain, and our claim to it ſuſpended, during his life.

He died on the 25th of September, 1782; but the *Nabob Nizam Ally Cawn* retained the poſſeſſion of it, the circumſtances of our affairs not admitting of our then reclaiming it.

2*dly*. The arrears of the Peſhcuſh for the Sircars in our poſſeſſion, which was five lacks of rupees per annum, ſtood on the 1ſt of March,

1784,

1784, at 31,32,666 5 4, to which that of Guntoor to the ſame time was nearly 1,50,000 rupees, making together 32,82,666 rupees.

And *3dly*. The rent of Guntoor, eſtimated by the leaſe granted by the Preſidency of Fort St. George to the Nabob *Walah Jah* in 1779, at the ſum above mentioned, afforded us a claim of above ten lacks of rupees on the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*.

Of the value of the Sircars I avoid to ſpeak. My private opinion furtively obtained ſtands on the records of the Court of Directors; and has been ſeverely reprobated. But as I do not form my opinions in haſte, and what has ſince paſt has rather added to the weight of the arguments on which that was founded than diminiſhed it, I need ſcarcely add, that if I were the ſovereign diſpoſer of the Company's actual property and intereſts, I would moſt eagerly accept the terms offered for the releaſe of the Sircars with ſome qualification of the inferior ſtipulations, where they

they might appear to clash with other existing engagements.

This transaction has been referred by the present dispatch to the Court of Directors, and Mr. *Johnson* directed to keep the negociation upon it suspended till their instructions regarding it may be received.

It seems to have been the fixed policy of our nation in India to enfeeble every power in connection with it; and I shall not be surprized to see the above proposal combated on that ground, with others more defensible. As a general maxim, I affirm it to be a most dangerous one; for in every application of it, we inflict a wound on the credit of our faith, and expose those who have trusted to it to the danger of falling a sacrifice to their more powerful and independent neighbours. The Sovereign of Hydrabad can never be an object of apprehension to the Company from any advantage which he derives from his dominions, were they of twice their present extent; but if any intestine or other cause of disorder

diſorder in the Marattah State, ſhould leave *Tippoo Saheb* at liberty to proſecute and accompliſh his deſigns againſt them, their acceſſion to his preſent ſtrength would prove more fatal to the Britiſh intereſts, than any other external event that in the probable courſe of fortune could befal them.

The King *Shah Allum* can ſcarcely be with propriety mentioned among the powers of India. Yet his name and family ſubſiſt, with all the latent rights inherent in them; and theſe are reſpected in a degree proportioned to their diſtance from obſervation, though but little, even by thoſe who moſt profeſs to acknowledge their obligation. The wretched apathy and indolence of the Shah himſelf render him incapable of availing himſelf of any ſupport, however powerful, to retrieve his affairs, or even to aſſume the direction of them in any ſtate. Theſe have been ſucceſſively adminiſtered by *Nudjiff Cawn*, *Mirza Shuffy Cawn*, and *Affraſiah Cawn*. The two laſt periſhed by aſſaſſination; that of the latter happened on the 2d of November laſt.

Mahdajee

Mahdajee Sindia having caſually arrived in the neighbourhood of the royal camp, which was at Agra, at the time of this event, aſſumed the charge of the King's adminiſtration in the name of the Peſhwa, for whom he obtained the royal grant of the office of Wakeel Muttaluk, a dignity of ſpecial appointment, and rarely known in the annals of the Houſe of Timur.

What conſequences this new aſſumed policy of the Marattahs may produce, I cannot foreſee; but think it more likely to embarraſs *Sindia* himſelf by the burthen of a ruined country and an exhauſted revenue, than to add to his own power, or to yield more than a title of faded ſplendor to his maſter. I regret it only as it muſt compel him to adopt a ſyſtem of caution which will diſable him from affording that ſupport which he had promiſed to the Prince *Jehandar Shah*, but in no reſpect can it prove hurtful to our intereſts, or weaken his connection with us.

The *Sics*, who may be conſidered rather as a ſect of ſchiſmatics than as a nation, have for ſome years paſt taken advantage of the weakneſs of the King's adminiſtration to invade and poſſeſs all his northern dominions. For what relates to them, to the King, to the Prince *Jehandar Shah*, and to the actual ſtate of the Marattah power in that quarter, I refer to No. in the Appendix, in which perhaps more will be found to gratify curioſity, than to afford uſeful information to thoſe who do not carry their views far into futurity.

Of the Nabobs *Aſſof O'Dowlah* and *Walah Jah*, I forbear now to ſpeak. Their condition is not to be explained in the limits of a ſummary deſcription, and has been brought to the full view of the Court of Directors, and poſſibly of the public, in volumes which have been written upon both.

I ſhall add ſome reflections upon the general ſubject of the political intereſts of the Company or of the Britiſh nation in India, which I deem connected with the ſcope and deſign of this review.

review, as they ariſe out of the paſt occurrences or are connected with the actual ſtate of our affairs; and in theſe alſo if I ſhall appear to ſpeak too much of myſelf, let it be remembered, that the whole of this compoſition is in effect a portion of the hiſtory of my own life in thoſe events of it which were blended with the public. Beſides, I am not ſure that the Company poſſeſſed a political character, or can be ſaid to have conducted their intercourſe with other nations on any ſyſtem of eſtabliſhed policy, before the period in which I was appointed to the principal adminiſtration of their affairs.

I know how readily many will both allow the poſition, and reprobate the ſyſtem, and admit me for its author, for the ſake of reprobating me alſo for it. I am not its author. The ſeed of this wonderful production was ſown by the hand of calamity. It was nouriſhed by fortune, and cultivated, and ſhaped, (if I may venture to change the figure) by neceſſity. Its firſt exiſtence was commercial: It obtained in its growth the ſudden acceſſion of military ſtrength and territorial dominion to which its political adjunct

was inevitable. It is uſeleſs to enquire whether the Company or the nation has derived any ſubſtantial benefit from the change, ſince it is impoſſible to retrace the perilous and wonderful paths by which they have attained their preſent elevation, and to re-deſcend to the humble and undreaded character of trading adventurers. Perhaps the term of the national exiſtence in India may have become ſuſceptible of a ſhorter duration by it; but it is that ſtate which it muſt henceforth maintain, and it muſt therefore adopt thoſe principles, which are neceſſary to its preſervation in that ſtate. To explain thoſe principles, and to ſhew the neceſſity of their conſtruction to the duration of the Britiſh dominion in India, is foreign from the preſent deſign, as it is perhaps too late to attempt it with any chance of its application to any purpoſe of utility. Yet ſo much as I have ſaid, was neceſſary to obviate the common objection, to which every meaſure and every maxim are liable, which are built on a different ground from that which exiſts only in the idea of thoſe who look upon the Eaſt-India Company ſtill as a body of merchants, and conſider commerce as their only object. I

have been repreſented to the public as a man of ambition; and as too apt to be miſled by projects of conqueſt. Though the only two facts* on

* Since Mr. *Haſtings* printed the firſt impreſſion of this work, the Rohilla and the Marattah wars have been ſo much ſubject of converſation, both in and out of Parliament, that I am induced to bring to one point of view, a few circumſtances, which I think will effectually clear Mr. *Haſtings* from the ſuſpicion of having acted improperly either in the Rohilla or the Marattah war. Lord *North* was pleaſed to obſerve, very lately, that the Rohilla war was not ſufficiently known in England, till the Secret Committee publiſhed their reports. His Lordſhip, however, as the Miniſter of this country, either did or ought to have known every particular of the riſe, progreſs, and concluſion of the war, ſo early as June, 1775. It was commenced in *April*, and concluded in *October*, 1774. But in order that every fair and impartial man may have an opportunity of determining of the juſtice of the war, I inſert the following particulars, which I have taken from the Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Secret Committee. Early in the year 1772, before Mr. *Haſtings* became Governor of *Bengal*, negociations were entered into between *Sujah Dowlah* and the Rohillas; andon the 17th of *June*, 1772, a treaty was finally concluded between them and reciprocally interchanged in the preſence of Sir *Robert Barker*, and authenticated by his Perſian interpreter. On the 24th of *March*, 1773, Sir *Robert Barker* makes a propoſition from *Sujah Dowlah*, that if the Rohillas break their treaty, he will pay the Company 50 lacks of rupees, if they aſiſt him in getting poſſeſſion of their country. On the

on which this imputation has originated, have been refuted on the cleareſt conviction, and this

the 6th of *May*, 1773, Sir *Robert Barker* writes to Mr. *Hoſtings* and the Select Committee, "It is well known, "neither promiſes nor oaths have been able to bind this "treacherous ſect of people to their engagements; their "own intereſts, or their own fears, are the only ſprings "by which they can be moved." On the 15th of *May*, 1773, Sir *Robert Barker* writes, that *Haffez Rhamet* ſtill declines anſwering the payment of the treaty; that his excuſe appears more to delay time, that he may diſcover how the affairs of his quarter are likely to turn out: And the General adds in the ſame letter, "I beg leave to ſend "you the copy of the Rohilla treaty, by which you will "perceive how literally it has been executed and performed, "notwithſtanding the evaſion of Chiefs," When Mr. *Haſtings*, and the Select Committee, in the latter end of 1773, determined to join their forces to *Sujah Dowlah*, in the proſecution of the Rohilla war, they ſtated very fully the breach of the treaty of *June*, 1772, as the ſtrong argument for the juſtice of the war. We were parties to that treaty; and Sir *Robert Barker* bears teſtimony to the Vizir's performance of all his conditions, as well as to the part the Engliſh took.

With reſpect to the Marattah war, it has been ſo clearly detailed, that not a doubt remains, I imagine, upon the mind of any man on that ſubject. It originated in *Bombay*. It was diſapproved of in *Bengal*. It was concluded by a Miniſter from the Governor General and Council. The peace was not approved of at home; and a diſcretionary power

this in the principal inſtance is univerſally acknowledged; the imputation ſtill remains; and I much fear that it has ſerved with others equally oppoſite to truth, for the ground of a recent and great

power was given to the Governor General and Council, to renew the engagements with *Ragoba*, if the conditions of the peace were not ſtrictly fulfilled. The Governor General and Council took every ſtep in their power to carry into effect the ſtipulations in Colonel *Upton's* treaty. Not a ſingle article was performed, when, on the 26*th* of *January*, 1778, Mr. *Haſtings* entered that minute, which, in a reſolution of the Houſe of Commons, is allowed to have been grounded on the orders of the Court of Directors; but though Mr. *Haſtings* laid ſo much ſtreſs upon the important intelligence he received from Mr. *Elliot*, and it is publiſhed in the Sixth Report of the Secret Committee, this circumſtance ſeems to have eſcaped the attention of many. Colonel *Leſter's* detachment was formed, and began its march in *June*, 1778. The Court of Directors approved the meaſure. They approved, with the knowledge of his Majeſty's Miniſters, the plan formed by Mr. *Haſtings* for defeating the views of the *French* in the Weſt of *India*. They never accuſed him of breaking the treaty of *Poorunda*.—From the month of *June*, 1779, and not before, the reſponſibility of the Marattah war unqueſtionably reſted with the Governor General and Council. The Marattah Miniſters required, as preliminaries to a treaty, the ſurrender of *Ragoba*, and the ceſſion of *Salſette*. I do not find that the Directors, or his Majeſty's Miniſters, have at any time cenſured Mr. *Haſtings*, or his Council, for not acceding to thoſe Preliminary Articles.

great national meaſure, moſt unfortunate in its conſtruction, if ſuch were the cauſes of it.

I can affirm, that the charge, ſo far as it reſpects myſelf, and I fear that I ſtand too conſpicuous a mark before my fellow-ſervants to be miſſed, or not to have been the aim of its intended direction, is wholly and abſolutely falſe, as it is inconſiſtent with any motive to which it could be aſcribed of pride, avarice, or thirſt of power; for what profit or advantage could I have acquired, or hoped to acquire, for inſtance, in a Marattah war; or what reputation in any war, the operations of which muſt neceſſarily depend on another, and him either taken in his turn from the roſter, or with a choice divided at the moſt between two or three officers ſtanding at the head of the liſt of the army? The firſt acts of the Government of Bengal, when I preſided over it, were well known at the time to have been of my formation, or formed on principles which I was allowed to dictate. Theſe conſiſted of a variety of regulations, which included every department of the ſervice, and

compoſed

compoſed a ſyſtem as complete as a mind incompetent like my own, though poſſeſſed of very ſuperior aids, could form, of military, political, productive, œconomical, and judicial connection.

I found the Treaſury empty, the revenue declining, the expences unchecked, and the whole nation get languiſhing under the recent effects of a mortal famine. Neither was this a ſeaſon for war, nor, occupied as I was in it, would candour impute to me even a poſſible diſpoſition to war. The land required years of quiet to reſtore its population and culture; and all my acts were acts of peace. I was buſied in raiſing a great and weighty fabric, of which all the parts were yet looſe and deſtitute of the ſuperior weight which was to give them their mutual ſupport; and (if I may ſo expreſs myſelf) their collateral ſtrength. A tempeſt, or an earthquake, could not be more fatal to a builder whoſe walls were uncovered, and his unfiniſhed columns trembling in the breeze, than the ravages or terrors of war would have been to me and to all my hopes.

I laid my plans before the Court of Directors, and called upon them to give me the powers which were requiſite for their accompliſhment and duration. Theſe were ſilently denied me, and thoſe which I before poſſeſſed, feeble as they were, were taken from me. Had I been allowed the means which I required, I will inform my readers of the uſe to which I intended to apply them. I ſhould have ſought no acceſſion of territory. I ſhould have rejected the offer of any which would have enlarged our line of defence, without a more than proportionate augmentation of defenſive ſtrength and revenue. I ſhould have encouraged, but not ſolicited, new alliances; and ſhould have rendered that of our Government an object of ſolicitation, by the example of thoſe which already exiſted. To theſe I ſhould have obſerved, as my religion, every principle of good faith; and where they were deficient in the conditions of mutual and equal dependance, I ſhould have endeavoured to render them complete; and this rule I did actually apply to practice in the treaty which I formed with the Nabob *Shujah o' Dowlah* in the year 1773.

With reſpect to the provinces of the Company's dominion under my government, I ſhould have ſtudied to augment both their value and ſtrength by an augmentation of their inhabitants and cultivation. This is not a mere phantaſy of ſpeculation. The means were moſt eaſy, if the power and truſt were allowed to uſe them.—Every region of Indoſtan, even at that time, groaned under different degrees of oppreſſion, deſolation, and inſecurity. The famine which had waſted the provinces of Bengal, had raged with equal ſeverity in other parts, and in ſome with greater, and the remembrance of it yet dwelt on the minds of the inhabitants with every impreſſion of horror and apprehenſion. I would have afforded an aſylum in Bengal, with lands and ſtock, to all the emigrants of other countries: I would have employed emiſſaries for their firſt encouragement; and I would have provided a perpetual and proclaimed incentive to them in the ſecurity of the community from foreign moleſtation, and of the individual members from mutual wrong; to which purpoſe, the regulations already eſtabliſhed were ſufficient,

with a power only competent to enforce them. And for the ſame purpoſe, and with a profeſſed view to it, I early recommended, even ſo early as the year 1773, the erection of public granaries on the plan ſince happily commenced, though late, and of which I think the deſcription worthy a place in the Appendix, where I ſhall therefore inſert it, No.

Thoſe who have been in the long habits of familiar communication with me, whether by letter or by diſcourſe, will know that the ſentiments which I have been deſcribing, are of as old a date as that of my late office in the firſt appointment and ſtate of it. And to every candid reader I appeal for his conviction of their effect, if I had been permitted to follow their direction: For what man is there ſo immoveably attached to his native ſoil, as to prefer it, under the ſcourge of oppreſſion, the miſeries of want, and the deſolation of war, embittering or deſtroying every natural affection, and ultimately invading the ſource of life itſelf, to a ſtate of peace, of external tranquility and internal protection,

tection, of assured plenty, and all the blessings of domestic increase?

Those who have seen, as I did, in a time of profound peace, the wretched inhabitants of the Carnatic, of every age, sex, and condition, tumultuously thronging round the walls of Fort St. George, and lying for many successive days and nights on the burning soil, without covering or food, on a casual rumour falsely excited of an approaching enemy, will feelingly attest the truth of the contrast which I have exhibited in one part of it, and will readily draw the conclusion which I have drawn from it, even without attending to the rest. That such a state as I have described would have been attained without imperfection or alloy, I do not pretend to suppose; but I confidently maintain, that under an equal, vigorous, and fixed administration, determined on the execution of such a plan to its accomplishment, it would have been attainable, even with common talents prosecuting it, to a degree as nearly approaching to perfection as human life is capable of receiving. The submissive charac-

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ter of the people; the fewneſs of their wants; the facility with which the ſoil and climate, unaided by exertions of labour, can ſupply them; the abundant reſources of ſubſiſtence and traffickable wealth which may be drawn from the natural productions, and from the manufactures, both of eſtabliſhed uſage and of new introduction, to which no men upon earth can bend their minds with a readier accommodation; and above all, the defences with which Nature has armed the land, in its mountainous and hilly borders, its bays, its innumerable interſections of rivers, and inoffenſive or unpowerful neighbours, are advantages which no united State upon earth poſſeſſes in an equal degree; and which leave little to the duty of the Magiſtrate; in effect, nothing but attention, protection, and forbearance.

But though I profeſs the doctrine of peace, I by no means pretend to have followed it with ſo implicit a devotion as to make ſacrifices to it. I have never yielded a ſubſtantial right which I could aſſert, or ſubmitted to a wrong which I could repel, with a moral aſſurance of ſucceſs proportioned

proportioned to the magnitude of either; and I can allude to inſtances in which I ſhould have deemed it criminal not to have hazarded both the public ſafety and my own, in a criſis of uncommon and adequate emergency, or in an occaſion of dangerous example.

I have ever deemed it even more unſafe than diſhonourable to ſue for peace; and more conſiſtent with the love of peace to be the aggreſſor in certain caſes, than to ſee preparations of intended hoſtility, and wait for their maturity, and for their open effect to repel it. The faith of treaties I have ever held inviolate. Of this I have given the moſt ample and public teſtimonies in my conduct to the Nabob *Shujah o' Dowlah*, to the Nabob *Aſſof o' Dowlah*, the Nabob *Walah Jah*, to the Rana of *Gohid*, to the Nabob *Nizam Ally Cawn*, Rajah *Futty Sing*, and *Mahdajee Sindia*; and I have had the ſatisfaction of ſeing the policy, as well as the moral rectitude of this practice, juſtified by the exemplary ſufferings of all who have deviated from it in acts of perfidy to myſelf,

or

or to the goverment over which I preſided during the time that I have had charge of it.

If in this diſplay of my own character I ſhall appear to have tranſgreſſed the bounds of modeſty, I ſhall not decline the charge, nor fear to aggravate it by adding, that I have never yet planned or authoriſed any military operation, or ſeries of operations, which has not been attended with compleat ſucceſs, in the attainment of its profeſſed objects; and that I have never, in any period of my life, engaged in a negociation which I did not ſee terminate as I wiſhed and expected: And let this concluſion be offered as an undeniable proof of the propriety and efficacy of the principles on which I have regulated my conduct in both.

It would not be either an unpleaſing or an unprofitable employment to turn from the ſurvey of our neighbours, and from the contemplation of their views, intereſts, powers, and reſources, and to look back on our own; mixing with the reflections obvious to our habits of thinking, thoſe

thoſe which would occur to the people with whom we have been engaged in paſt hoſtility, or who may expect to be eventually concerned with us, whether as friends or foes, in future operations. Very different would be the obſervations made by a ſpectator in ſuch a point of view, from thoſe which paſs in the mind of a mere individual, through the clouded medium of his own wants and feelings, and with the terrors and diſcontents of his fellow citizens aggravating his own: And ſuch, perhaps, as the following would be his reflections, as the different objects of his contemplation paſſed in ſucceſſion before him.

No State can carry on extenſive military operations for any length of time, without impoſing ſome burthens upon its ſubjects, or ſubjecting them to conſequent inconveniences; and thoſe that ſuffer will complain, and condemn meaſures which create partial exigency, without conſidering their object and tendency. To the complaints of individuals, the adherents of party will ſuperadd their accuſations, exaggerate the temporary evil that exiſts, and darken by deſpon-

dency the bright expectations of a future period. Such particularly has been the case in Bengal; and murmurs, suspicions, and despair, have been transmitted from India to England.

In proportion as our distresses have been, or have appeared to be, pressing, the power, resources, and advantages of our enemies have been supposed to accumulate; and an idea is adopted without reflection, that the cause which diminishes our resources, operates on one side only, without producing a similar effect on the strength of our enemies; as if it were in their power to marshal armies, and undertake military expeditions, without any augmentation of expence or distress to individuals. With as limited a judgment men are apt to draw conclusions from the errors and deficiencies of Government, and the mismanagement of military operations, not reflecting that our adversaries have also their difficulties to surmount, which arise out of the imperfection of human policy and the depravations of self-interest; and that the fortune of contending States, as of simple individuals, as often

turns

turns on the different effects of their mutual blunders and miſconduct, as on the ſuperiority of ſkill and exertion.

But widely different is the eſtimate formed, by thoſe whom neceſſity has led us to oppoſe or attack, of our ſtrength and reſources. They behold with aſtoniſhment the exertions that have been made from the banks of the Ganges; and reaſoning as we have done from their own diſtreſſes, lament the neceſſity that has engaged them in wars with a power capable of making ſuch exertions, and whoſe reſources, inſtead of being diminiſhed, muſt appear to them to augment. Inſtead of being able to extend their incurſions to the capital of our dominions, which at a period little remote from the eſtabliſhment of the Company's authority they did with ſucceſs, they find themſelves attacked in the centre of their own territories, and all their exertions required for the defence of them. They find, notwithſtanding the temporary ſucceſs they have derived from accident or miſmanagement, that we have freſh armies ready to take the field, and

that whilſt our ſpirit is unabated, our ſtrength is ſufficient to give efficacy to its reſolutions.

The concluſion I would draw from theſe premiſes is, that the vigorous exertions which we have made for the defence and ſecurity of our own poſſeſſions, have impreſſed an idea of our ſtrength and reſources among the powers of India, which will, more than any other motive, contribute to eſtabliſh the preſent peace on a firm foundation; to ſhew that if our reſources have ſuffered a diminution, thoſe of the States with which we have been engaged in war, have felt, in probably a greater degree, the ſame inconvenience; and finally to evince the propriety of thoſe exertions, notwithſtanding the expence with which they have been made, by the event itſelf, which has evidently proved to all the powers of Hindoſtan and Deccan, that their combined ſtrength and politics, aſſiſted by our great European enemy the French, have not been able to deſtroy the ſolid fabric of the Engliſh power in the Eaſt, nor even to deprive it of any portion of the territories over which its controul extends.

REVE-

REVENUES.

The three principal ſources of the revenues enjoyed by the Company in Bengal, are the land-rents, ſalt, and opium.

The ſyſtem eſtabliſhed in February, 1781, for the management and collection of the land-rents, has continued to the preſent period, without any material variation; and the compleat information which has been laid before the Company upon this ſubject, renders particular explanations ſuperfluous. I ſhall therefore content myſelf with inſerting a few general remarks.

The eſtabliſhment of the preſent Committee of Revenue, or ſome other founded on the ſame principles, appears to me the the propereſt mode of agency that can be adopted for the controul of the revenue department.

The ſyſtem of government in Bengal is ſo complicated, and embraces ſo many and diſtinct objects,

objects, that it would be difficult for any ſet of men who may become members of the Supreme Adminiſtration, to enter into the detail attending the revenues; and this difficulty will amount to an impoſſibility, if thoſe who poſſeſs the ſupreme controul ſhould be appointed members of it without any previous local knowledge and experience.

It will be obſerved, that the amount of the ſettlement annually varies, and that it has never been compleatly realized without ſome balance. I may venture to affirm, that this has been the caſe for the laſt century, and that our predeceſſors the Mahommedans, though poſſeſſed of advantages which a fluctuating European Adminiſtration can ſcarce ever hope to attain, cannot boaſt of ever having collected the entire annual aſſeſſment. It may perhaps, in time, be poſſible to prevent nearly any diminution either in the amount of the ſettlement or collections; but whilſt the Government requires ſo large a proportion of the produce of the country, cauſes beyond the reach of human controul will occaſionally

ally operate, to render ſome indulgence in favour of its ſubjects indiſpenſible; and the formality of agreements will but ill juſtify the rigour of exaction.

With reſpect to the amount of the preſent ſettlement, I am ſo far from deeming it too heavy, that I am clearly of opinion, it may by prudent management, formed upon local experience, admit of an increaſe. I ſpeak generally; for the particular diſtribution will in many inſtances be found unequal; a defect in the ſyſtem, which can never be remedied by any permanent rule, but muſt be corrected by temporary application, according to the exigency of particular circumſtances.

The public in England have of late years adopted very high ideas of the rights of the Zemindars in Hindoſtan; and the prevailing prejudice has conſidered every occaſional diſpoſſeſſion of a Zemindar from the management of his lands as an act of oppreſſion. I mean not here to enter into any diſcuſſion of their rights,

or to diſtinguiſh between right, fact, and form, as applied to their ſituation. Our Government, on grounds which more minute ſcrutiny may, perhaps, find at variance with facts, has admitted the opinion of their rightful proprietorſhip of the lands. I do not mean to conteſt their right of inheritance to the lands, whilſt I aſſert the right of Government to the produce thereof. The Mahommedan rulers continually exerciſed, with a ſeverity unknown to the Britiſh adminiſtration in Bengal, the power of diſpoſſeſſing the Zemindars on any failure in the payment of their rents, not only pro tempore but in perpetuity. The fact is notorious; but leſt proof of it ſhould be required, I ſhall ſelect one inſtance out of many that might be produced; and only mention that the Zemindary of Radjeſhaby, the ſecond in rank in Bengal, and yielding an annual revenue of about twenty-five lacks of rupees, has riſen to its preſent magnitude during the courſe of the laſt eighty years, by accumulating the property of a great number of diſpoſſeſſed Zemindars, although the anceſtors of the preſent poſſeſſor had not by

inheritance

inheritance, a right to the property of a ſingle village within the whole Zemindary.

I ſhall only further obſerve on the propoſed plan of reſtoring the Zemindars to the poſſeſſion of their lands, and the management of their revenues, that unleſs care ſhould be taken at the ſame time to eſtabliſh ſome mode of guardianſhip, with a view to remedy the defects of minority, profuſion, and incapacity of the Zemindars, their reſtoration, which, with it the appearance of juſtice, will often terminate in acts of the greateſt ſeverity; in the total diſpoſſeſſion of the Zemindars, or in conceſſion on the part of Government in their demands for the revenues.

It may not be improper to take notice of the aſſiduity exerciſed in eſtabliſhing a belief in Europe, that the collection of the revenues in Bengal is enforced by repeated acts of perſonal ſeverity. No proof has yet been exhibited to the public of this aſſertion; and I might content myſelf with this obſervation, without adding that the fact is incapable of proof, ſince it does not exiſt.

During the laſt four years, a proportion, exceeding one half of the whole revenue of Bengal, has been received at the Khalſa in Calcutta, from the different renters, without any intermediate agency; and I am authorized in affirming, that during this period, a ſingle inſtance cannot be produced of any renter having been beat there, for the purpoſe of compelling the payment of his ſtipulated rent. I ſhall cloſe this ſubject with a reflection, that appears to me too important to be omitted. In recommending the inſtitution of the Committee of Revenue, I meant it with a reſerve, that the expreſs objects deſigned by it ſhould be carried into execution. The candour and ſincerity which I have ever profeſſed in giving my opinion to the Company, on matters of importance to their intereſts, or of even perſonal concern to myſelf, call upon me to make a confeſſion, which other motives ſhould induce me to conceal. I acknowledge that ſome parts of this inſtitution, which depended upon the ſupreme adminiſtration in Bengal for their completion, ſtill remain unaccompliſhed; that even its profeſſed and fundamental object of making Calcutta the place of receipt of all the

revenues,

revenues, without paſſing through the ſubordinate treaſuries, has been defeated by cauſes which my ſituation did not allow me to controul. This object comprehended the gradual removal of the different collectors, as faſt as their ſervices could be diſpenſed with, and on this account only was unattainable. If the ſame act of the Legiſlature which confirmed me in my ſtation of Preſident over the Company's ſettlements in Bengal, had inveſted me with a controul as extenſive as the new denomination I received by it indicated; if it had compelled the aſſiſtance of my aſſociates in power, inſtead of giving me opponents; if, inſtead of creating new expectations, which were to be accompliſhed by my diſmiſſion from office, it had impoſed ſilence on the intereſted clamours of faction, and taught the ſervants of the Company to place their dependance upon me, where it conſtitutionally reſted; if, when it transferred the real controul over the Company's affairs from the Direction to the Miniſters, inſtead of extending, it had limitted the claims of patronage, which every man poſſeſſing influence himſelf, or connected with thoſe who poſſeſſed it, thought he had

a right to exert; and if it had made my continuance in office to depend upon the rectitude of my intentions, and the vigour with which they were exerted, inſtead of annexing it to a compliance with thoſe claims, I ſhould have had little occaſion, at this period, to claim the public indulgence for an avowal of duties undiſcharged. But the reverſe took place in every inſtance. I mean to apply theſe reflections, though ſuggeſted by one circumſtance only, to my ſituation in general.

If the intereſts of the nation are truly conſulted, a total change in the ſyſtem muſt take place: For whilſt private intereſts are allowed to ſtand in competition with, or in oppoſition to arrangements founded on the public good; whilſt thoſe who cenſure the conceſſions made to them in all inſtances which have not a reference to themſelves or to their connections, ſtill perſiſt in recommending them; and whilſt the official exiſtence, public reputation, and private fame, of the members of the Government in Bengal are maintained or ſacrificed in proportion to the conceſſions made,

or

or with-held, the intereſts of the Britiſh nation in it muſt verge to a decline.

Enough has been ſaid to ſhew the pernicious conſequences of this ſyſtem, which is publicly proſcribed, and privately ſupported; which no man dares avow, yet many combine to maintain. To diſcuſs it more minutely would be invidious, and perhaps entail upon me reſentments, which, though I do not fear, I would wiſh to avoid. I have made a ſufficient ſacrifice to truth; my ſucceſſors in office may perhaps benefit by this confeſſion. The duties and functions of the ſupreme government in India will never be well diſcharged, unleſs it meets with the conſideration due to it. But to return from this digreſſion to the two remaining ſources of the revenues, the ſalt and the opium. My obſervations on both will be ſhort.

The plan for the management of the ſalt, was of my formation. The minuteneſs of inveſtigation employed to fix the ſtamp of demerit on my plans in general, will juſtify the ſeeming vanity of aſſerting my claim to approbation for the ſucceſs

of

of one inſtitution at leaſt, which in its outſet was oppoſed, and condemned univerſally. The intricate, deſultory ſeries of management, which was formerly applied to this department, has given place to one uniform ſyſtem of controul; the perplexity of the former accounts of the ſalt, no longer exiſts, and the advances for the manufacture of the quantity produced, and the amount gained, are made to appear in clear, conciſe ſtatements; an uncertain collection has been gradually improved into a permanent and increaſing revenue; and as long as Mr. *Vanſittart*, or ſome other perſon of qualifications equal to his, ſhall preſide over the office, and be allowed to conduct it according to the rules of its inſtitution, I may venture to aſſure the Company of an annual revenue of fifty lacks of rupees from this department, being the clear and nett amount of a new and ſimple appropriation of a natural ſource of revenue to the public ſtock, without tax or exaction; ſubſtituted in the place of an old ſyſtem of artificial intricacy, by which, in the proceſs of the laſt three years of its exiſtence, the Company had ſuſtained a loſs, inſtead of deriving a benefit from it.

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The conqueſt of a foreign principality, which had added half a million of pounds ſterling to the national income; a ſplendid extenſion of dominion; and a large ſtore of lucrative offices to miniſterial patronage, though purchaſed with the blood of thouſands, maintained with an enormous expence of fortreſſes and military garrriſons, and the hazard of national diſgrace, with the loſs of it, would have crowned the warrior, by whoſe fortunate valour it was won, with deathleſs glory; and votes of parliamentary thanks, bonfires and illuminations, would have proclaimed his praiſe and the public triumph. A bloodleſs acceſſion of public income, gained by the ſilent operation of official arrangements, perpetuated in its duration, and fixed in its value by its inherence to the eſſence of the State itſelf, unincumbered with military eſtabliſhments and frontier defences, and miniſtering ſubſiſtence to a whole people, both in its immediate diſtribution as a neceſſary of life, and by the returns of a foreign commerce, is allowed to ſink unnoticed in the blended accounts of the general treaſury, becauſe it was not produced by any of thoſe efforts of the mind to which human pride

has

has affixed the claim of renown, and in which every man appropriates to himſelf a ſhare of the national glory.

It is well known to thoſe few who have acceſs to the records of the Government of Bengal, or rather to the few who may have impoſed on themſelves the heavy labour of purſuing them, that the meaſure which produced this fund was not only of my formation, but undertaken againſt the judgment of all my colleagues, and barely ſuffered to paſs with the reſponſibility of it, at my own reiterated inſtance thrown excluſively on myſelf for its ſucceſs. Surely then I may be allowed to make this diſplay of its acknowledged merits, ſince its failure would have entailed on me endleſs diſgrace, with the aggravated reproach of preſumption, ignorance, and warned temerity.

It has alſo been urged as a reproach againſt me, that in providing the opium by contract, I have conſulted the intereſts of my friends in preference to thoſe of the Company. This charge, like many others, has often been repeated, and as often been refuted;

refuted; I ſhall therefore only briefly remark, that whilſt the manufacture of opium was managed by the Company's ſervants in the Bahar province, the profit upon the ſales was too inconſiderable to be deemed an article of revenue; that the Company, in conſequence of contracting for the proviſion of opium, have in fact derived a certain annual income from an article which ſcarcely yielded any before, by appropriating to themſelves thoſe profits which were diverted into other channels; and that I know no law either moral or municipal, that ſhould preclude my friends from taking upon themſelves the charge of an engagement, the profits of which were to ariſe from their ſkill, induſtry, and exactneſs in the performance of it. It muſt be remembered, that this remark, as well as the reproach, applies to a ſingle inſtance only.

I have already ſpoken of the population of the country, and ſhall conclude the ſubject of the revenue with ſome obſervations on the ſtate of cultivation: I am authorized by my own experience to aſſert, what every man who has reſided

long in Bengal, and has had opportunities of viſiting the countries beyond the Company's juriſdiction, is qualified to confirm, that the territorial poſſeſſions of the Engliſh in Bengal and Bahar, are not only better cultivated than the lands of any other State of Hindoſtan, but infinitely ſuperior to what they were at the time the Company received the grant of the Dewanny, or for many years preceding that period. It is alſo a fact, that the produce of the lands in common years, ſo much exceeds the quantity required for the conſumption of the people, or for the purpoſes of exportation, that the difficulty of converting it into ſpecie conſiderably affects the collection of the revenues in many parts of the country, and in ſome degree diſtreſſes the Ryots to furniſh their ſtipulated quotas of rent; that there is no country in the world, where the inhabitants in general procure a ſubſiſtence with the ſame eaſe and cheapneſs as in Bengal; and that, if by any ſudden exertion of induſtry, the quantity of land in cultivation could be greatly increaſed, the Company would derive no advantage from it, nor the labourers receive any compenſation for their toil.

I have

I have often with pleaſure expatiated on the peculiar talents of the late Mr. *Clevland*, in civilizing the inhabitants of the mountainous diſtricts of the Jungleterry, or wild and hilly lands of Rajemehal, by a ſyſtem of conciliation which will long endear his memory to thoſe who have felt the benefits of it; and I cannot deny myſelf the gratification ariſing from the reflection, that the exertion of thoſe talents was in a great meaſure owing to the public ſupport and private encouragement which he received from me. In the honours beſtowed upon his memory, the Board have conſulted the intereſts of the Company, by holding forth for imitation a character ſo worthy of it. The immediate advantages of his labours are ſeen in the ſecurity which the inhabitants of the adjacent lands poſſeſs; no longer apprehenſive of being plundered of the produce of their labour by a lawleſs banditti, they have extended their cultivation over large tracts of land, till lately impaſſable; and the country at the bottom of the Rajemehal hills, which I myſelf have ſeen in a ſtate of nature, has aſſumed an appearance of univerſal fertility. The remote advantages will be more conſiderable,

ſhould the continuance of the ſame plan of civilization increaſe the intercourſe which has ſo lately been eſtabliſhed between the inhabitants of the hills, and thoſe of the low lands. At all events, the Company have acquired a large acceſſion of new ſubjects, who are not only peaceable in themſelves, but have been ſucceſsfully employed in maintaining the peace of the country, and who being warmly attached to us, by the ſuperior benefits they have received from their civilization, may, in caſe of public exigency, be uſefully employed in the defence of our territories againſt foreign invaſion.

Of the buſineſs of the commercial department, I ſhall ſpeak but little. It is a ſubject of too great extent, and involves too many nice and important queſtions to be fully compriſed in the narrow limits which I have preſcribed to myſelf in this ſummary review; yet I cannot paſs it over without a few reflections.

The inſtructions which the Court of Directors framed in conſequence of the act of the 13th, and tranſmitted to Bengal, marked the firſt limits of the

the reſpective powers of the general and commercial departments; and in fact conſtituted the latter independent of the former. The proviſion of the inveſtment was left to the ſole management of the latter; the ſalaries of its members were fixed; and it was expreſsly declared, that they ſhould not be liable to be ſuſpended, or diſmiſſed by the authority of the general government. The only power which was given to the Governor General and Council relative to the Board of Trade, was that of ſupplying the neceſſary funds: But this power afforded them no means of controul over the conduct of that Board in the proviſion of the inveſtment, or the application of the money; ſince in the exerciſe of it they muſt be regulated by other conſiderations than the conduct of the Board of Trade; for whatever that might be, the ſupplies muſt be the ſame, and could not be either with-held or diminiſhed without a material injury to the Company's affairs. Yet this was the only power that the Governor General and Council poſſeſſed. Men whoſe ſalaries were fixed, and who neither held their appointments, nor could be removed from them, by the authority of the Go-

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vernor General and Council, naturally felt themſelves independent; and the conſequence has been that the Governor General and Council, inſtead of attempting to controul the management of the Board of Trade, have been even unable to impoſe on their correſpondence thoſe reſtraints of decency and reſpect which are due from one public body to another. In one inſtance only has it been in the power of the Superior Government to interfere with the management of the Board of Trade, and in that their interference was attended with an immediate and acknowledged advantage to the Company.

I allude to the proviſion of the inveſtment in the year 1781, 1782, and 1783, by means of the ſubſcription loan, when the Members of the Board of Trade reſident in Calcutta, to whom the charge of it was entruſted, acted rather as the factors of the ſuperior Board, than as agents for the Company in their official and collective character.

But the power of interference, which the Board exerciſed in this inſtance, was grounded on very peculiar

peculiar circumſtances, which may never again occur; and it is not therefore to be conſidered as an exception tending to invalidate the general poſition which I have aſſerted, that the Board of Trade, in the proviſion of the inveſtment, are conſtituted independent of the Governor General and Council.

Yet in all the late correſpondence from Europe, the Court of Directors ſeem to conſider the reſponſibility as primarily veſted in the Governor General and Council. Whether applauſe or cenſure reſult from the management of the buſineſs of providing the inveſtment, it is to the Governor General and Council that the ſtrictures of the Court of Directors are expreſsly directed and applied. They are afterwards, indeed, communicated by them to the Board of Trade; but applauſe and cenſure equally loſe their force when they are not openly and pointedly applied, and when they paſs through the medium of others, who may diminiſh their efficacy by participation, but, poſſeſſing no authority themſelves, cannot increaſe it in the conveyance.

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From theſe premiſes I have demonſtrated, that the management, direction, and execution of all matters relative to the Company's commerce, are wholly and independently veſted in the Board of Trade, whilſt the reſponſibility virtually reſts with the Governor General and Council. This is ſo abſurd a contradiction of principles, that it is ſufficient to have proved its exiſtence without tracing its conſequences. In a former part of this review, I have avowed my opinion that the attention of the ſuperior Government of Bengal ſhould not be perplexed with the intricacies of commercial detail; but it is clearly expedient, that either ſome degree of efficient controul ſhould be veſted in the Governor General or Council, or the reſponſibility wholly withdrawn from them, and transferred to the Board of Trade. Theſe are queſtions for the Company to determine. I do not offer any opinion on them at preſent.

The next defect which I have to point out in the conſtitution of the Board of Trade, proceeds from the rule eſtabliſhed by the Company, that all their ſervants, according to their ſeniority of rank

rank in the general liſt, ſhall ſucceed to the ſeats becoming vacant at the Board of Trade. This is founded on principles of juſtice towards their ſervants; but it is productive of eſſential injury to their own affairs.

The general government, and the commercial department in Bengal, which might otherwiſe be conſidered as two ſeparate and diſtinct lines, are ſo blended in this reſpect, that the perſons who fill the inferior ſtations of either, are all choſen from the general liſt of ſervants under the authority of the Governor General and Council. The buſineſs, however, of each requires very different talents, and to excel in either, habitual practice and long application are neceſſary: So that although removals are not poſitively prohibited, few ever change the line in which they have once engaged, until they arrive at a certain rank in the ſervice; when all, whatever their talents may be, and whether they deſire it or not, muſt riſe into the Board of Trade; by which means often the ſervices of thoſe who have made the revenues or other

branches of the general department the object of their ſtudy and attention, are loſt to the Company; and they are thrown into a line where all their former knowledge becomes totally uſeleſs, and they are deſtitute of that which they ought to poſſeſs; probably too late in life to ſtudy a new profeſſion; their minds are therefore diſguſted at the change; and their thoughts are bent on returning to their native country.

If the ſervants of the commercial department were completely ſeparated from thoſe of the general government, it might perhaps be proper, when no particular objections exiſted, that the former ſhould riſe according to their ſeniority of rank to fill the vacant ſeats of the Board of Trade. —But whilſt the ſervants of both departments continue to rank in one general liſt, ſeniority ſhould be ſet aſide, or only allowed the preference where equal talents and knowledge come into competition. I do not pretend to ſay whether the right of choice ſhould reſt in the Court of Directors at home, or in the ſuperior government in India. Another defect in the preſent conſtitution

conſtitution of the Board of Trade conſiſts in the number of its members. Four members have been thought ſufficient by the Legiſlature of Great-Britain for the general government of India; and the Company have thought fit to continue the original number of members in the Board of Trade, which is no leſs than eleven. For what purpoſe is there ſo great a difference? It will never be alledged, that the objects of deliberation of the latter are more important or numerous than thoſe of the former. It will, perhaps, then be ſaid, that they have a greater detail of executive tranſactions.

This is not true; and if it were admitted, I would require no other grounds for reducing the number; for I affirm, and every man who has been converſant in the practice of Boards muſt be ſenſible, that the detail of minute executive tranſactions is more correctly and expeditiouſly conducted by a few, or even by a ſingle man, than by many. The Company's inveſtment was never, I believe, at any time better managed

than in the year 1773, when it was left to the ſole ſuperintendency of Mr. *Alderſey*.

Poſſibly it will be obſerved, that although the Board of Trade conſiſts of eleven, yet there is never that number aſſembled at the Preſidency, it being an eſtabliſhed rule, that four of the commercial chiefſhips ſhall be filled by the members in rotation. This alſo I affirm to be one of the defects of their conſtitution. The charge of the ſubordinate ſtations ſhould never be given to perſons poſſeſſed of a right to vote at the Board; for under ſuch circumſtances, their merits will ſeldom be impartially ſcanned: Either their faults will be overlooked, or if party diſputes ſhould unhappily prevail, their exertions will be diſturbed and checked by unneceſſary cavils.

In theſe obſervations which I have made on the defects of the preſent ſyſtem, I do not allude to any particular inſtances. I ſpeak only of general principles, which muſt always invariably produce the ſame conſequences. I ſhall now

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offer a few remarks on the general ſubject of the Company's commerce in Bengal.

Although we have ſo long been in poſſeſſion of the ſovereignty of Bengal, and have provided our inveſtments, not as the returns of commerce, but as the means of remitting the ſurplus of the revenues of the country; yet we have not been able ſo far to change our ideas with our ſituation, as to quit the contracted views of monopoliſts for objects tending to promote the proſperity of thoſe territories, from which we derive ſo valuable a tribute.

Hence it is, that in all the correſpondence of the Board of Trade, we find conſtant complaints of private merchants making advances to the Company's weavers; of their giving greater prices than have hitherto been given by the Company; of their debaſing the quality of the manufactures, by taking off goods which the Company refuſe; and in ſhort, of their injuring the proviſion of the Company's inveſtment by their competition and interference. Let all this

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be. It is of leſs conſequence, conſidered as a national concern, that the inveſtment ſhould be procured cheap, and that the commerce of the country ſhould flouriſh; and I inſiſt upon it as a fixed and uncontrovertible principle, that commerce can only flouriſh when it is equal and free. Nor in truth do I think that the Company, conſidered merely in their mercantile capacity, would much ſuffer from the operation of ſuch a principle. When commerce is left to itſelf, it will correct its own evils. The private merchant, ever quick ſighted to his intereſt, will only maintain a competition whilſt a profit is to be derived from the trade; and ſo long as he derives a profit, the Company ought to derive one alſo. But if in the courſe of this competition, the prices paid to the manufacturers ſhould riſe beyond their juſt proportion compared with the ſales, or if the market in Europe ſhould become over-ſtocked, the private merchant would ſoon deſiſt, prices will fall in India to their former rate, or even lower, and the ſtock in the market, from not being ſupplied as uſual, will again be reduced to a quantity more proportionate to the

demand.

demand. This muſt inevitably be the conſequence, whilſt the conſumption continues, and cannot be ſupplied (which I believe is the caſe with moſt of the articles of the Company's trade) from the productions of any other quarter of the world. If, however, the Company's inveſtment ſhould now be productive of leſs profit on the invoice than formerly, the cauſe is leſs to be traced in the increaſe of the prime coſt of the goods paid to the manufacturers in India, than in the great growth of the trade of foreign nations, which has raiſed a competition againſt the Company in the ſale of Indian commodities in all the markets of Europe.

This ſuggeſts an idea of monopoly to which I am not averſe; becauſe, if it be purſued, it will affect only our European rivals, without prejudicing the commerce of our territories. But it muſt be purſued not by reſtrictions, but by counteraction. To find what means are in our power for this purpoſe, let us return to thoſe circumſtances which I have in another place enumerated as the cauſes of the growth of the

trade

trade of the Danes, and I might have added the Portugueſe. Theſe I have ſaid are, firſt, the advantage they poſſeſſed during the late war of navigating their ſhips in ſafety, whilſt our own and thoſe of the French and Dutch were expoſed to great riſk. Secondly, the facility with which they procured credit in India, even from the ſubjects of Great-Britain.

The former of theſe cauſes ceaſed with the war; the latter ſtill exiſts; and it is there that we muſt apply our means of counteraction.—The Daniſh and Portugueſe veſſels that have lately come to India, are moſtly fitted out by private adventurers: No great capital is neceſſary, and little credit is required in Europe for their out-fit, as their cargoes outward-bound conſiſt only of proviſions and bulky articles, which are procured at a ſmall coſt. When they arrive in Bengal, the avidity with which individuals embrace every opportunity of remitting their fortunes to Europe, enables them eaſily to procure money or credit for the purchaſe of a valuable inveſtment. They grant bills or bonds payable

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in Europe at a diſtant period. They then carry home their cargoes, and convert them into money, in time to diſcharge their bills or bonds when they become due. All this operation, therefore, is chiefly carried on by means of the money or credit which they meet with in Bengal. But the profit on the voyage is their own; and their nation gains in the increaſe of its navigation and wealth.

Let us now ſuppoſe that the Engliſh Company were to open their treaſury, and extend their inveſtment in proportion to the ſums which they could procure in India for bills on Europe. I believe it is certain, that if ſuch a meaſure had the ſanction of the Company at home, and the terms were equal, few Britiſh ſubjects would heſitate to lend them their money in preference to foreigners. The conſequence would be, that the Danes, Portugueſe, and others, would be obliged to bring from Europe the amount neceſſary to purchaſe an Indian inveſtment which would require a capital that few private adventurers are poſſeſſed of, and would occaſion a long

outlay of money, and conſequently a heavy loſs of intereſt. With theſe diſadvantages entirely on their ſide, they would have to enter into competition with the Engliſh Company, who, from having eſtabliſhed factories under the direction of ſervants accuſtomed to deal with the manufacturers, and from being able to their advances long before the ſeaſon for receiving and ſhipping the goods, (without availing themſelves of the influence which they might derive from their being in poſſeſſion of the government of the country) ought to have a decided advantage over all foreigners, and particularly over private adventurers, whoſe ſtay is limited to a few months, in providing their inveſtments both of the beſt quality and at the cheapeſt rates. If, nevertheleſs, foreign nations ſhould ſtill find it for their advantage to purſue this commerce, they muſt then be obliged to carry it on by means of gold and ſilver brought from Europe; for there is ſcarcely any thing elſe which would anſwer; the conſumption of European articles in Bengal being confined chiefly to the European inhabitants, and of a very limited extent; and ſuch

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an important addition to the circulation of money would be attended with the moſt beneficial effects in enriching the provinces under the Company's government. Nor need the Company grudge the high prices which a competition under ſuch circumſtances might occaſion in the firſt coſt of their goods. They would ſtill receive the greateſt part of their inveſtment virtually for nothing; not as the return of commerce, but as a tribute. The ſources from which this tribute flow would increaſe with the proſperity of their territories; the tribute itſelf would be rendered more valuable; and their profits on that part of their inveſtment which they procured for bills on Europe would at leaſt be equal to thoſe which induce foreign nations to perſiſt in the competition.

It appears plain therefore, from what I have ſaid, that if the Company were to open their caſh for bills on Europe, one of theſe conſequences would enſue; either their provinces would be enriched by the bullion and ſpecie imported by foreigners, or the foreigners muſt deſiſt from the trade, and leave to the Company not

only a *national* but an *univerſal* monopoly; from which the nation, not leſs than the Company, would be gainers in proportion as England would become the emporium for ſupplying all the countries of Europe with the productions and manufactures of India.

I ſhall now haſten to bring this, perhaps already too tedious, performance to its cloſe, having lengthened it greatly beyond my firſt expectation, and with much apparent deviation from its profeſſed object. As the labour of peruſal will be increaſed by both theſe cauſes, the readers of it, whoever they may be, for I have written it without any knowledge of its deſtination, will have a right to be informed of the purpoſes for which this trouble was exacted from them; and this ſatisfaction I hope they will receive in the following apology.

My original deſign, as I have ſtated it in the commencement, was, *Firſt*, to aſſign the motive for my reſignation of the ſervice; *Secondly*, to detail the means which I took to ſurrender my

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place in it unincumbered to my ſucceſſor, and unſuſceptible of any ill conſequence to the joint adminiſtration; and *Thirdly*, to deliver a ſummary review of the actual ſtate in which I left the Government of Bengal in its diſtinct departments at the time of my ſeparation from it.

The three ſubjects, though thus diſcriminated, will be found on examination to bear ſo cloſe a relation to each other, that it was not ſo well practicable to treat of the firſt without entering into as large a diſcuſſion of the other two, both ſucceſſively, and neceſſarily following it. It is in effect the recapitulation of the tranſactions of three months winding up an Adminiſtration of thirteen years. In the former, it was not more my ſtudy to clear off the weight of incumbent buſineſs, than to fix the direction of it by the principles to which I had invariably, from the commencement of my office, endeavoured to conform it. It was not poſſible to explain the circumſtances to which this rule was applied, without aſſuming a yet wider circumference, including both the application of recent meaſures

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to the conſtruction of thoſe which were connected with them in a remote period of time; the vindication of the latter from the imputation of error, inconſiſtency, or miſconduct; and even the declaration of what I would have preferably done, if left to the free exerciſe of my judgment in caſes in which I had no preſent option but the choice of proffered evils.

Indeed the nature of my ſubject, conſidered as a vindication, required a larger and more elaborate detail than ſimilar recitals of facts and events which paſs nearer the ſphere of common obſervation. At ſuch a diſtance, any charge may be ſucceſsfully hazarded againſt the devoted victim of a party, and more eſpecially of one poſſeſſing the reverence of names which ſtand too high for imputation, and holding the truſt of compiling materials for the formation of opinions and acts of the firſt national authority. Againſt ſuch antagoniſts the voice of truth itſelf, ſo remote, will ſcarce be heard; and if heard, will make no impreſſion on minds under the influence of prejudice or determined by worſe motives againſt the acknow-

acknowledgment of conviction. I ſhould not have been ſurprized if to the accuſations of rapacity, corruption, oppreſſion, thirſt of blood, and other enormities with which the clamour of privileged calumny has aſſailed my character, it had borrowed the aid of contempt to ſwell the foul catalogue with gambling, drunkenneſs, and every ſpecies of profligacy that could debaſe the human mind. Equal credit would have been given to the aſperſion by thoſe who on no better grounds have given it, or have affected to give it to other tales of equal falſehood and malignity; and probably ſuch would have been my lot, had I not poſſeſſed, in the incomparable vigilance and ability of my declared agent in England, and other powerful and well informed minds, ſuch inſtruments of repulſion as might diſcourage the attempt by the certainty of its recoiling with ſhame on the aſſailants.

But however diffuſe theſe ſheets may be beyond the limits which candour may be willing to allow me, I yet hope and believe that they will be found to contain both new and uſeful information.

tion. I know not whether I may aſcribe theſe qualities to the following reflections, which I have purpoſely reſerved for the cloſe.

From the vehemence and perſeverance with which my immediate ſuperiors laboured during the courſe of ten years to weaken my authority, to deſtroy my influence, and to embarraſs all my meaſures, at a time when their affairs required the moſt powerful exertions to ſuſtain them, which I alone by my office could direct; and from the great importance which they have aſcribed to points, ſome of which had no relation to their intereſts; and others were even repugnant to them; I much fear, that it is not underſtood as it ought to be, how near the Company's exiſtence has on many occaſions vibrated to the edge of perdition, and that it has been at all times ſuſpended by a thread ſo fine that the touch of chance might break, or the breath of opinion diſſolve it: And inſtantaneous will be its fall whenever it ſhall happen. May GOD in his mercy long avert it!

To ſay why a dominion held by a delegated and fettered power over a region exceeding the dimenſions of the parent ſtate, and removed from it a diſtance equal in its circuit to two-thirds of the earth's circumference, is at all times liable to be wreſted from it, would be a waſte of argument, nor would it be prudent to aggravate the portrait by diſplaying all the artificial evils by which a fabric, ſo irregular even in its beſt conſtruction is looſened and debilitated.

It is true, that it has hitherto ſtood unimpaired, becauſe it has met with no domeſtic ſtroke of fortune to agitate and try its texture, one late inſtance perhaps excepted, which was too ſuddenly repelled to produce the effect which might have attended a longer duration of it. And it may yet ſtand for ſome years to come, though ſtill liable to the ſame inſecurity. The remedy is eaſy and ſimple; but I fear it will be vain to propoſe it; becauſe, if it is not (as I believe it is not) contrary to the principles of our national conſtitution, it will at leaſt meet with

very formidable oſtacles in the prejudices which ariſe out of it.

I affirm, as a point inconteſtible, that the adminiſtration of the Britiſh Government in Bengal, diſtant as it is from the reach of more than general inſtruction from the ſource of its authority, and liable to daily contingencies which require both inſtant deciſion, and a conſiſtency of ſyſtem, cannot be ruled by a body of men variable in their ſucceſſion, diſcordant in opinion, each jealous of his colleagues, and all united in common intereſt againſt their oſtenſible leader. Its powers are ſuch, that if directed by a firm and ſteady hand, they may be rendered equal to any given plan of operation; but may prove the very inſtruments of its deſtruction, if they are left in the looſe charge of unconnected individuals, whoſe intereſts, paſſions, or caprices, may employ them in mutual conteſts, and a ſcramble for ſuperiority.

It has been my lot to derive, from long poſſeſſion and caſual influence, advantages which have overcome the worſt effects of my own deficiencies;

ciencies; and it has been one maxim of my conduct (may I be pardoned for the apparent boaſt, but neceſſary alluſion) to do what I knew was requiſite to the public ſafety, though I ſhould doom my life to legal forfeiture, or my name to infamy.

I could verify this by inſtances in which by an implicit ſubmiſſion to poſitive duty and expreſs orders, the Company's poſſeſſions might have been devoted to deſolation, and even its exiſtence annihilated. I hazarded an oppoſite conduct; and whatever may have been its effects, I have at leaſt had the happineſs to ſee one portion of the Britiſh dominion in India riſe from the loweſt ſtate of degradation; another reſcued from imminent ſubjection; and that which gives life to the whole, enjoying the bleſſings of peace and internal ſecurity, while every other part of the general empire was oppreſſed by war, or the calamities of inteſtine diſcord. I may not expatiate on ſuch a digreſſion. I mention it only to ſhew, that if the Britiſh power in India yet holds a reprieve from ruin, it derives its preſervation from cauſes which

are independent of onſtitution; and that it might have been loſt if left to that alone for its protection.

The inference to be drawn from theſe premiſes is, that whatever form of government may yet be eſtabliſhed for theſe Provinces, whether its controul be extended to the other preſidencies, or confined to its own demeſnes, it is neceſſary that the Governor, or firſt executive member, ſhould poſſeſs a power abſolute and complete within himſelf, and independent of actual controul; his character, which requires little more than two qualifications, an inflexible integrity, and a judgment unſuſceptible of the bias of foreign ſuggeſtion, ſhould be previouſly aſcertained, and its conſiſtency aſſured by the pledge of his life for the faithful diſcharge of ſo great a truſt.

I have ſaid that this is an unpopular doctrine, and liable to be rejected as oppoſite to our domeſtic conſtitution; but it derives its ſource even from the conſtitution itſelf, which requires, in every remote member of the general State, a conſtruction

ſtruct. from its own, but the own nature is moſt abhorrent. The negligences, vices, and crimes of a political agent, are all totally foreign in their qualities from thoſe offences in common life which the law defines, and againſt which it has made a proviſion in the degrees of puniſhment denounced againſt the commiſſion of them. The factious or corrupt member of a council, may weaken every uſeful ſpring of government; may embarraſs, obſtruct, and thwart all its meaſures; may ſtop the execution of its daily official buſineſs; may occaſionally employ its powers for the moſt pernicious purpoſes, and ſtill keep clear of legal condemnation. He may even avail himſelf of the letter of preſcribed orders in ſuch a manner, either by a ſtrained or ill-timed obedience, as to defeat their intention, or pervert them to effects the moſt oppoſite to it.

The real character of ſuch a man will not eſcape the obſervation of thoſe who live within the ſphere of his agency; and to them the motives of all his actions will be known, on grounds of the

the independent of constitution; and th[illegible] incapable of direct[illegible] loſt if left to th[illegible]ence. Yet it is on poſitive evidence only that his offences can be proved; nor even when proved can they operate to his puniſhment, unleſs they fall within the prohibition of ſome poſitive law; although the lives of multitudes may have been deſtroyed, and the ſafety and honour of the State itſelf endangered, by the perpetration of them. But it is only by a proceſs of law, and by a breach of ſome written ſtatute, or known law of the land, that the ſubject of a free State can be condemned. A conſtitution formed of a Governor, with limited powers, and a Council, may ſubſiſt under an arbitrary Monarch directing it, and be better conducted than that of a Governor alone; but it cannot be too ſimple and unreſtrained for the rule of a province ſo remote from a free State, like that of Great Britain.

To obviate miſconceptions, I think it proper to mention, that I allude only to ſuch powers as appertain to the nature of government; not to ſuch as might affect the lives, perſons, or property

perty of individuals living within its authority, but under the protection of the law of England. In all cases which do not neceſſarily fall within the cognizance of thoſe who have the immediate charge of the State, the juriſdiction of the Governor ought to be more than that of any other civil magiſtrate, or juſtice of the peace. It is unneceſſary to treat of the mode of ſucceſſion, or the other dependent arrangement of the general ſyſtem.

Though the ſtate of kingdoms is liable to diſſolution from cauſes as mortal as thoſe which intercept the courſe of human life; and though my opinion of the diſtempers which threaten that of the Britiſh empire in Bengal, may obtain credit from all who read it, yet I fear that few will yield to its impreſſion. Like the ſtroke of death, which every man knows will come, but no man acts as if he felt the conviction which he avows and thinks he feels, the very magnitude of the cataſtrophe may in this caſe blunt the ſenſe of thoſe to whom it is viſibly apparent.

I expect

I expect this effect, and foreſee that I may expoſe myſelf to much obloquy by recommending ſo new and unpopular a ſyſtem. Yet theſe conſiderations have not deterred me from endeavouring to render this laſt ſervice to my country, and to my ever-reſpected conſt[illegible] aſſured, if ſucceſsful, of my reward [illegible]us applauſe of my own mind, brigh[illegible] decline of my exiſtence; and of this c[illegible]tion in the dreaded reverſe, that no means [illegible]n the compaſs of my ability had been left untried to prevent it.

FINIS.